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Program and Project Management
Introduction
by Dr. Edward J. Hoffman
PPMI Program Manager
N ASA's Pro ram/Project Management Ini-
g
tiative was pleased to sponsor this confer-
ence. The timing for this conference in
many ways could not have been better.
NASA has taken off on a course that is
leading to major changes in our programs and in the
very way we manage our projects. From redesigning
the Space Station to inquiry into how projects are to
be managed, we are witnessing a time of tremendous
change in project management.
In the last year alone, we have seen the genesis of
numerous studies and activities to help define the
future of NASA. The NASA strategic planning com-
mittee has been looking to define the future missions
as well as the roles and responsibilities within the
Agency. In separate but related activity, much scrutiny
is being given to better defining project management
at NASA and establishing a new NMI. Severa/activi-
ties have led to recommendations, aimed at reducing
the costs and time in our programs, which will have
far-reaching effects on project management. In addi-
tion, much has taken place over the last year in the
areas of systems engineering p,rogram control and
procurement that will influence how j3rojects are
managed, and how we will be training ruture mem-
bers of the project team.
The rapidity of change that we see today is likely to be
just as rapid tomorrow. Peter Vaill has used the
metaphor of white water rafting to describe what
managers must be prepared to handle; his term seems
to aptly capture the challenges of project management
today. It was hoped that this conference would better
enable us to deal with some of the changes and ch_- _
lenges that we face today. During the three days in
Hagerstown, many of the key issues, in project man-
agement were discussed. We tried to put together a
conference where members of the NASA family, other
agencies and industry could freely discuss these issues.
The individuals who agreed to serve as speakers and
panel members are an impressive array of people. I am
sure that you will find many of the ideas expressed to
be quite stimulating and even provocative.
I read,where Einstein would try "thought experi-
ments, visualizin I himself in a circumstance which
was improbable ir order to generate practical ideas.
This conference summary is also intended to lead to
your own "thought experiments" pertaining to NASA
and project management.
I am sure many of the ideas and presentations will
reinforce your own views. I am also sure that many of
the ideas will force you outside the boundaries of
what you consider sensible, based upon your own
experience. It is hoped that this document will rein-
force some of the knowledge you have as well as pro-
vide you the opportunity to form new ideas about
project management.
This document is, by no means, a complete transcript
of the three-day conference in April 1993. Rather, this
is a representative sampling of some of the newest
ideas in NASA on program and project management
Every effort has been made to avoid duplicate ideas
and comments, and so not all speakers and panelists
are included. What remains is for your enjoyment and
edification.
Dr. Edward J. Hoffrnan is the NASA Program Project
Management Initiative Pro,gr,am Manag, .er.In this role he
is responsible for training and development programs,
consulting services for project management teams, lessons
learned, knowl,'dge capture, and research and special
studies on program md project management.
The Best Job in Aerospace
by A. Thomas Young
Martin Marietta Corporation
111 III
he program/project man_er's job is, in my
opinion, the best job in me aerospace uni-
verse. Whether one is working at NASA or
inap rivate com puny, the prog ram man ag-
er's job is often filled with frustration,
stress, and risk-taking, but it offers opportunities and
rewards unavailable anywhere else. Being a program
manager means integrating a variety of disciplines-
such as science, engineering, planning, finance,
human resources, etc.-to accomplish an important
goal, and really making a difference and seeing the
result of your work. In short, program management is
"being where the action is" in the development and
application of exciting new technologies and
processes.
The principles of successful program management are
no secret, but they bear reiteration from time to time
to remind us of the complexity of the program man-
ager's job. In my view, there are seven key steps:
• Pick the best people. Getting the right people on
your team, then putting them in the right slots, is
what separates successful projects from also-rans.
But selection is only the first part of the process.
Then you have to train your people properly, give
them the right tools, "empower" them to do jobs,
and support them in their decisions.
Instill attention to detail. Projects rarely fail
because of large flaws. Usually, it's overlooking the
seemingly small details that dooms otherwise sound
programs.
• Build in adequate reserves. "Redundancy" has been
a mandate since the early days of the manned space
rOgram, for good reason-repair shops are few and
r between in space. Working in experimental pro-
grams such as NASA's requires having adequate
margins, whether they be in funding, scheduling,
computing capacity, spacecraft performance, and so
on.
• Design according to technical rec_uirements.
While every project begins with a tecnnical need,
political considerations soon tempt project man-
agers to weave in other factors. To avoid such influ-
ences, you must build an inviolate shield around
your project, insulating it against outside forces.
Avoid fixed-price contracts. Space exploration is
still an experimental and highly uncertain under-
taking. Recognizing this, managers of NASA pro-
jects should accept the notion that fixed-price con-
tracts are inherently out of place when one is
pushing the boundaries of technology. This is a
controversial concept in today's budget climate, and
I would never defend bad management by a con-
tractor. But the alternative philosophy-i.e., trying
to eliminate risk altogether-could, over time, effec-
tively destroy NASA's willingness to take risks.
• Involve the user. The emphasis in project manage-
ment is on integrating representatives from both
inside and outside the organizationl invoiving_e
customer at each step of the project makes him or
her a contributor ana proponent, not a distant, and
often critical, observer.
• Put quality first,, This management tool has long
graduated from buzzword status to become one
of the most potent techniques a leader has to build
in performance at each step of the project. Quality
cannot be "balanced" with other variables; it must
be put first. If it is, then cost and scheduling will
certainly fall into place.
A Thomas Rung is President and Chi4Operaang O_-
cer of Martin Marietta Corporation in Bethesda, Mary-
landHe joined Martin Marietta in 1982 after a 21-
year career at NASA, where he served as director of the
Goddard Space Flight Center. Prior to 1980 he was
deputy director of the Ames Research Center.
Improvements in
Project Management at NASA
Agency-wide Issues
Presented by William C. Huber
Assistant Director of Program Development, Marshall Space Flight Center
l n the summer of 1992, the NASA Admin- 6.
istrator asked Marshall Space Flight Cen-
ter Director Jack Lee to chair an Agency-
wide team to conduct a six-month review
of 30 recent NASA projects. The team 7.
found eight major factors that drive NASA program
cost and technical increases inadequate Phase B defin-
ition, unrealistic dependence on unproved technolo- 8.
gy, annual funding instability, complex organizational
structures, cost estimates that are often misused,
scope additions due to "requirements creep," schedule
slips, and an acquisition strategy that does not 9.
encourage cost containment.
The fact that similar findings appear in earlier NASA
studies indicates that NASA may not have learned
fully from past reports, as illustrated in the "Common
Issues" matrix on the next page. Many of the dozen
recommendations of the Program/Project Institution-
al Team have also appeared in earlier studies:
10.
Comply with Phase C/D "period of understand-
lng on time-phased contractor buildup
(NMI 7120.3).
Freeze requirements at the end of the "period of
understanding. Resist easy changes.
Appoint project manager and key team members
at beginning of Phase B and keep them into Phase
C/D if possible.
Allocate adequate contingency reserves
(NMI 7120.3) for project managers but hold the
Allowance for Program Adjustment (APA) at
Headquarters for scope changes and major prob-
lems.
Promulgate progressive competition/down selec-
tion procedure to minimize gaps between pro-
gram phases.
.
.
.
.
Establish a Program Management Council
(PMC) to review, rank and recommend all subse-
quent Phase B studies and Phase C/D program
starts.
Establish an Agency-level funding wedge for these
same studies and starts.
Direct program/pro'eCt/a _ managers to define
requirements better. P nning should carry Phase
B at least through PRR or PDR before Phase
C/D starts.
Provide stable funding for high priority NASA
programs by multi-year funding or by internal
protection.
11. Provide comments to Code H, NASA Headquar-
ters, on "Award Fee Initiatives" for cost
containment.
12. Avoid "buy-in" by requiring cost estimates, by
providing project funding profile to prospective
contractors for Phase C/D, and by emphasizing
the scoring of cost realism in the source selection
process.
While some of the recommendations have been pro-
posed for many years, the Administrator has accepted
them and handed them off to the Program Excellence
Team chaired by Howard Robins. The team has pre-
pared a new NMI, currently in the review cycle, based
upon these recommendations.
5. Use performance specifications instead of detailed
design specs in new starts where possible.
Common Issues Matrix
e_
Conduct Training for Program/Project Managemenl "/" "_ x/ x/ _ 4 :4 _/ -
Conduct Annual Meetin_ of Project Managers _/ .r-- ....
DevelopRealistic Cost Estimates 4 4 x/ 4 x/ 4 4
Clarify HQ, Ro]e in Project Management 4 4 x/ "_ '_ x/ x/ _/ _/
Improve Adequate Front End Plann!ng Definition _/ x¢ x/ x/ 4 4 _/ ixt " i
Need for Long Range Vision and Agency Goals ,/ ix/ x/ 4 4 i4 _/
Conflict Between Institutional and Program Needs x/ 14 _ !:
Attention to Operations and Logistics 4 _/ x/
Need for Adequate Requirement Definitions ",/ ",/ _/ _/ ",/ 4 x/
Contractor and NASA Buy-ins ",/ 4 _/ _/ _/ x/ _/
Clarity and Communication of Mission Goals and _" x/ "_ 4 "/ "_ '/ "4 4 _/ x/
Objectives =
Need for Communication at All NASA Levels and x/ x/ x/ 4 _/ x/ x/ x/ _/ x/
Contractor Teamwork
Improve Management of Contingency Funding _ x/ 4 _/ x/ _ '/
.Eroding In-house Technical Expertise "/ _/ '/ _/ 4 i_ _/
Need for Risk Assessments 4 x/ ",/ _/ _ _ 4 _¢ -__ :
Increasing Technical Complexity of Projects 4 4 x/ ,/ s I
Develop Formal Top-Down Planning Process 4 4 x/ 4 _ _ x/
Formalize SIE Process 4 x/ x/ 4
Maintain More Consistent Documentation x/ x/ 4
Better Manage Congressional Issues x/ :
Over-commitment ,/ q 4 IV
Need to Establish Improved International Involvement s/ 4 4
Improve Program Control Function--Develop Agency x/ x/ ",/ "/ 4 x/
Models, Control to Ba_line, etc.
iAcquisition Reform _ '/ 4
Planning the Project
Agency-wide Issues
Presented by William C. Huber
Assistant Director of Program Development, Marshall Space Flight Center
I Hubersays, t ,.r, oj t -
n brief, Bill " "'h ° _'r ec man
agers job is to deliver a successful product
on time and within budget." To do that
requires careful, thorough planning. Fol-
lowing on the results of the recent Project
Planning Institutional Team, Huber notes that "best
studies have shown a strong correlation between the
percentage of the project cost spent in the defini-
tion/planning phase and the amount of cost overrun
realized during the development. It is recommended
that 10 to 15 percent of the project costs should be
spent during Phase B."
Huber listed ten criteria for good Phase B planning:
Adequate funding
i Advanced activities in critical areasdevelopment
Key personnel assigned in Phase B and carried in
Phase C/D
• A strong project team with good technical
support
• The elimination of all TBDs (To Be Determined)
• Performance of adequate risk assessment (both
technical and programmatic)
• Development of a usable Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS)
• At least one, good, objective, non-advocate review
• A good Phase A study as a beginning base
• A well defined set of products
Documented set of products
Baseline/reference system and operational description
Definition of all external interfaces
Detailed life cycle costs
Detailed schedule with known critical path
Updated acquisition plan
Request for proposal for Phase C/D
Realizing that a project manager may not have all ten
criteria satisfied, Huber _,,ave his thoughts of what a
project manager should' do to deliver a successful
roduct. Many of these suggestions are what should
e common sense, but many also require some dis-
cipline and know-how to turn the tide when any of
the ten criteria are not present or lacking in some way:
• Unrealistic dependence on unproven technology
Assess the technology requirements vs. readiness
Define alternative approaches to the project and their
impacts
Plan an advanced development program so that all
technology is proven during Phase B
Carry alternative approaches until technology is proven
Establish decision points in Phase B where alternative
can be dropped or accepted
• Complex organizational structures or multiple/
unclear interfaces
- Determine in Phase A what other organizations
are essential to a successful project (e.g., HOo
other Centers, international, science working
groups, other agencies)
- Keep structure/involvement as simple as possible
- Obtain approval of outside involvement early
- Select and define instruments as early as possible
- Attempt to define all external interfaces in parallel with
project definition
Eliminate TBDs
Keep ample margins in interfaces
• Scope additions due to requirements creep
Don't add "nice to have" changes (just say no)
Thoroughly understand "make work" changes before
authorizing
Assure adequate budget and schedule before accepting
program-level directed changes
Keep contract specifications at "requirements level"
rather than "design level" to minimize changes
During Phase B, thoroughly understand and document
the requirements
• Schedule slips
- Understand the relationship between time and money
Understand the detailed schedule and the critical path(s)
so as to define workarounds and other alternatives
In Phase B, develop detailed schedule and cost
estimates, conduct programmatic and technical risk
analysis
The project manager, Huber adds, is the one responsi-
ble for proper planning. A poor plan is almost impos-
sible to implement.
Strategic Planning...
Mapping the Way to NASA's Future
Presented by Dr. Charles J. Pellerin Jr.
Deputy Associate Administrator for Strategic Planning
I IIIII III IIIIII [ T
e have plans," said Pellerin, "what we
lack is strategic management" which
is so vital for an agency bereft of a
mandate as clear as the one set by
President Kennedy. Pellerin described
himself as a "Process Manager" as opposed to a project
manager.
Strategic planning efforts began in earnest January 6,
1993, when the Senior Management Group (NASA
Administrator, Associate Administrators and Center
Directors) decided on an overall strategic planning
process and agreed on a plan development method.
Besides some basic assumptions, such as 5 percent
growth in FY93 and a historical balance of 80 percent
for human piloted and 20 percent for robotics explo-
ration prod.ram funding, the group agreed to a mix of
small, meamm and large space service missions. They
agreed to link aeronautics and space technology to
economic competitiveness, and to limit "Mission to
Planet Earth" to a "go as you pay" basis.
purpose wanes with 124 new members-new members
of Congress focus more on constituent needs than
support for NASA. The fourth purpose is laudable, he
notes, but EOS has had a shaky start and stockholder
support is uneven. The fifth purpose has been a low
priority for NASA and has been recognized as weak.
Finally, the last stated strategic purpose may be a high
priority for scientists, CEOs, trade association heads
and Congressional committee heads, but they may
tend naturally to defend the status quo because it pro-
tects their interests. Frequently, however, these leaders
have their own agendas and work at cl_oss purp6s-es to
each other and to NASA.
So what is NASA to do? Unify around a program like
human exploration of the Moon and Mars? Unify
around a role like America's technolo ical leadershi ?
1 ,, ,ig POr shal we find some other glue for NASA, to
mobilize and inspire the entire agency, to convince the
p,,,.olitical system_ and the public, and to create a "tangi-
Die image.
From a field perspective, a Strategic Planning Red
Team found no single centerpiece that represents what
NASA does. Rather, "we are a diverse conglomerate,'
says Pellerin, in need of strategic planning as a man-
agerial leadership process. Pellerin's assessment of
NASA's traditional "Strategic Purposes" follows:
"We boldly expand frontiers in air and space to:
• Provide inspiration and hope for the future.
• Contribute to world peace.
• Enhance economic growth and competitiveness.
• Understand and help preserve the environment.
Support broad national social goals.
Maintain a high-tech industrial base."
As for the first purpose, Pellerin jokingly noted a sur-
vey which showed that school kids were most interest-
ed in "space, dinosaurs and ghosts," placing this
industry in the company of the dead andthe extinct.
The secondpurpose points to a foreign policy factor
in the founding of NASA, but the space race is over
and the Russian space program is no longer perceived
as a threat. The third purpose reflects some perception
in Congress that NASA is a "jobs program," but that
The first step, according to Pellerin, is to listen to
what others say, think and feel. On February 17,1993,
space policy analysts and professional staff members
briefed the Senior Management Group and told
NASA that Congress has little motivation to find
"inspiration" in these troubled times, that NASA may
have less relevance to the national agenda and that
NASA needs to improve its "tangible" benefits. While
NASA may be supported because of an ongoing "jobs
program, the agency's actions are perceived as going
against U.S. competitiveness. External analysts say
that only NASA perceives education as a central role
of the agency.
Internally, Pellerin described the work of the NASA
Employee Vision Team, which involved about 7,000
employees (22 percent) in one way or another. Work-
ing by consensus, the team found a growing recogni-
tion by employees that NASA must be relevant to
America's needs. The meaning and value of "explo-
ration" was the most difficult issue; is it a means to an
end or an end itself?. Should we then stress concrete
benefits or the intangibles such as hope, inspiration
and pride? Their consensus: "Explore the universe to
6
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enrich human life by stimulating human curiosity,
opening new worlds of opportunity, and uniting
nations of the world in this quest." The common per-
ception that only humans explore and that robots
gather scientific data tends to cause rifts between Cen-
ters, but the emergent consensus reads: "Both humans
and robots contribute to expanding frontiers,' and
both should be integrated into programs." Aeronau-
tics, also, was recognized as important to all NASA
installations. The NASA Vision thus includes ex]?lo-
ration, science, and aeronautics, but directed to tour
national goals for economic growth, preserving the
environment, educational excellence and peaceful
exploration.
In March 1993 the group studied the Vision Team
findings plus the results of six NASA Town Meetings
held across the country in November and December.
The res,ults were consistent across the country: the
majority of citizens were not satisfied with the NASA
employee vision, finding it not bold or specific
enough, claiming it lacked emphasis on exploration
and space settlement. The primary concern expressed
in each of the NASA Town Meetings, involving more
than 4,500 people, was: improve communication with
the public. Other concerns, in order of importance,
were: to make space transportation safer at lower cost,
to do more to support teachers and students, and to
improve both technology transfer and R&D efforts.
A new framework of "shareholders" or "customers"
was formed from those efforts. From this perspective,
new alignments of programs were proposed. Instead
of program drivers like space exploration for purposes
of political symbolism, the new NASA may well con-
centrate on the immediate economic impact on key
industries, technology transfer and spinoffs, and large-
scale space-based commerce, Pellerin suggested.
Instead of the intangibles of inspiration or of explo-
ration as an end in itself, the new NASA might do
well to emphasize the tangible benefits of technologi-
cal leadership, scientific discoveries, international par-
ticipation, environmental monitoring and analysis,
and educational outreach.
The details for a new "shared vision" are still being
worked out, according to Peller!n, but they cluster
around four interrelated hosts or missions :
We boldly expand frontiers in air and space...
Today's NADA A New Alignment
Leadership - Foreign Policy
Infrastructure
Scientific Discovery
Environment
Jobs Program
Technology for Indust ty
Space Commerce
Environment
Scientific Discovery
Education
Technology for Industry
Space Commerce
Education
Leadership - Foreign Policy
Social - Cultural Diversity
High-Tech Industrial Base
Social - Cultural Diversity
High-Tech Industrial Base
Infrastructure
Jobs Program
7
• Mission for Space Development
Develop the basis for large-scale, space-based commerce
Provide the capability for long-duration human and
machine operation in space
Develop and transfer technology to U.S. industry
• Mission for Scientific Research
Basic Scientific Research
- Develop and transfer technology to U.S. industry
• Mission for Planet Earth
Provide environmental basis for sustainable economic
growth
Develop and transfer technology to U.S. industry
• Mission for Aeronautics and Space Industry
Maintain U.S. leadership in existing aeronau_tics and
space industries
Develop new capabilities and industries for future space-
_d commerce - - -
The accompanying functional capabilities were also
critical to the strategic planning process thus
addressed as part of the plan:
• Access to Space -
Develop strategies for assuring access to space
Assess the state of technology and identify key areas for
investment
• Quality Assurance
Develop strategy for efficient development of high
quality, safe programs
Develop and transfer quality assurance expertise to U.S.
industry
• Operations
Develop strategies to optimize operations across the
Agency
Develop and transfer operational expertise to U.S.
industry
• Technology
Develop strategies for technology development to
support NASA missions
Identify key areas for investment both internally and
externally
• Institutional Development
Develop strategies for managing and changing the
institution
The next steps will require the Senior Management
Groul to continue the Strategic Planning Process,
estam a teams to develop appropriate analyses and
metrics, and have HQ offices analyze program re-
alignments.
(The final outcome and implementation of the Strate-
gic Planning activities is not clear at this time dueto
Dr. Pellerin's sabbatical, and the impact of Vice Pi'esi-
dent Gore's National Performance Review activities.
Efforts are being made to continue this work and for-
mulate a preliminary plan.)
Dr. Charles J. Pellerin Jr. is the NASA Associate Deputy
Administrator for Strategic Planning. He is responsible
for developing NASA's vision and defining the path,
including resource allocation. In 1992 Dr. Pellerin
became Deputy Associate Administrator for the Office of
Safety and Mission Quality at the request of the NASA
Administrator.
Program Excellence
Agency-wide Issues
Presented by Dr .C. Howard Robins Jr.
Deputy Associate Assistant Administrator
A n update of the ongoing effort to
strengthen and streamline the policies
and the processes of program/project
management in NASA was presented
by Howard Robins, the team leader
for the Program Excellence Team (PET), currently
rewriting NASA NMIs on program management.
Robins pointed to factors identified for at least the
last 15 years that lead to poor management. These
include: new starts that exceeded available resources,
inadequate definition, contractor and NASA "buy-
in," and failure and/or inability to control to a defined
baseline. He noted that current median cost growth
for NASA projects is 37 percent (average of 63 per-
cent) and median schedule growth is 40 percent (aver-
age of 63 percent), while the nominal length of major
projects is 12 years. The PET proposes to shorten life-
cycle time and enhance delivery of performance on
schedule and within budget.
To accomplish this, the team proposes change in the
policies and processes of project management. The
end product will be a consolidated NMI replacing
three previous ones on project management, acquisi-
tion, and the Program Approval Document (PAD).
Replacing the PAD will be the PCA (Program Com-
mitment Agreement). New start approval will require
not only a formal commitment to deliverables, sched-
ule and budget (the PCA process), but also a require-
ment showing compatibility with the Agency strategic
plan.
Preliminary design is being moved from Phase C to
Phase B, and Phase B (definition) initiation approval
will have to come from the Deputy Administrator
rather than the Program Associate Administrator. The
des!gn/cost basis is also changed, from "development"
to life cycle. Agency-level go-ahead approval reviews
will be established for Phase B and Phase C/D. These
proposals for change are "better" because they will
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reduce or eliminate the number of premature Phase B
starts, establish program commitment as a two w__
process, as well as several other benefits. Phase C/D
(design/development) time will be shortened by about
four years, making the project "faster." The project
should be "cheaper" because of less time in develop-
ment through better definitions, a down- select acqui-
sition process and improved cost control.
Robins noted that several issues remain unresolved for
OMB/Congress, contractors, and the Agency, involv-
ing major cultural change, but adoption of the new
policy and process can lead to aggressive, high-visibili-
ty improvement in NASA program/project manage-
ment. Next steps for the Program Excellence Team
include a complete review of proposals with senior
management, completion of the NMI process, and
then the enormous task of institutionalizing the whole
process.
Institutional
Associate
Admit _strator
Dr. C. Howard Robins Jr. began his NASA career more
than 30 years ago at the Langley Research Center. In
1984 he was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator
for Management. He was promoted to Associate Admin,
istrator for Management in JanUary 1989-a_cl was
appointed to his current position as Deputy Associate
Administrator for Space Systems Development in October
1991.
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New NASA Procurement Initiatives
The Cost Control Process
by Deidre A. Lee
Associate Administrator for Procurement
D eidre Lee had previously served as a
member of the Space Exploration Initia-
tive's Synthesis Group and helped coor-
dinate the Agency's Red/Blue Team stud-
ies to reduce out-year costs of major
space and aeronautics projects without undermining
mission objectives. Lee described eight procurement
initiatives as of April 1993 and gave contact names
and phone numbers to the delegates and dinner
guests:
Award Fee Initiative. A comprehensive review of
award fee contracting at NASA has been conducted.
Draft policy will be published in the Federal Register.
Key elements of the policy include: emphasis on selec-
tion of contract type, use of base fee, role of cost con-
trol in evaluations, performance incentives on hard-
ware contracts, a final comprehensive rating, and
uniform scoring procedures. Public comments are
being reviewed and changes made as appropriate.
Point of Contact is Mr. T. Luedtke (202) 358-0003.
Contractor Liability Requirements. Contractors' lia-
bility for loss or damage to Government property or
correction of failures to comply with requirements of
the contract under cost-type contracts is currently
severely limited. Contractors are only liable in those
cases in which a loss is attributed to fraud, willful mis-
conduct, or lack of good faith at high management
levels within the company. Unless such situations can
be shown to exist, the Government assumes liability
for loss and pays the cost (not fee) of repairing or
redoing the effort. A number of options have been
examined with the Office of Federal Procurement Pol-
icy and Industry to determine if an equitable, effective
solution can be developed to place greater responsibil-
ity on contractors. The conceptual parameters, Ul_On
which a contract clause will be based, were published
in the Federal Register on March 30,1993. (A report to
Congress was sent in June 1993. The final rule and
implementation are expected in November 1993.)
Point of contact is Mr. T. Deback (202) 358-0431.
Contractor Metrics. NASA is currently implementing
the contractor metrics initiative which will allow
NASA and contractor senior management to monitor
in-process contractor performance. The metrics will
have two products: a semi-annual report card to be
.... nsent to the contractor s Chief Executive Officer girl g
notice as to how the contractor is performing, and a
set of charts (primarily run or trend charts) which
will be updated quarterly and/or semi-annually. The
metric areas are: cost, schedule, technical, award fee,
subcontracting plan, project manager's assessment,
and continual improvement. The metrics have been
applied to 30 selected contracts, reflecting approxi-
mately 60 percent of NASAs 1993 commercial busi-
ness obligations. The contractor metrics initiative will
not require any changes to the contracts or regula-
tions, but will use data already being collected. NASA
Headquarters Program Offices have completed their
reviews of the metrics submissions and provided their
inputs to the Office of Procurement. (The first set of
metrics reports were sent out July 30, 1993.) Point of
contact is Mr. K. Sateriale (202) 358-0491.
Change Order Reduction/Process Change. In an
effort to manage contract changes more effectively
and control cost growth, NASA has implemented sev-
eral initiatives to dramatically reduce the Agency's vol-
ume of outstanding unpriced change orders. First,
increased Headquarters oversight and reporting
requirements have resulted in significant reduction in
the number of Center change orders remaining
unpriced for protracted periods of time. Second, Pro-
curement has empowered Center technical and pro-
curement personnel to employ Total Quality Manage-
ment principles to revamp Center policies that
impede their ability to manage change effectivelcy and
price them in a timely manner. Finally, the Heactquar-
ter's offices of Space Flight and Procurement are work-
ing jointly to implement policies at our major Centers
to ensure change orders are issued on a strict excep-
tion basis and limit NASA's cost liability to only the
Agency's most urgent requirements.
A revision of the NASA Federal Acquisition Regula-
tion (FAR) Supplement that will implement this poli-
cy NASA-wide is expected in October 1993. Collec-
tively these measures should improve the overall
change order management and ensure that any change
orders issued are characterized by solid technical deft-
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nition, realistic cost estimates, and markedly
improved definitization timeliness. Point of contact is
Mr. R. Wilson (202) 358-0486.
COTR Training. It has been documented through
internal and external audit and management review
that the amount and quality of Contracting Officer's
ence topics and ensuring publication and follow-up
on post-conference issues. Membership in the PAT is
limited to one year and will be rotated among inter-
ested aerospace contractors and NASA procurement
representatives. (The NASA/Industry PAT second-
year membership of 27 members held its first meeting
on May 7, 1993, with the next meeting scheduled for
Technical Representative (COTR) training is incon- mid-July.) Point of contact is Mr. D. Muzio (202)
sistent within NASA. This may be a contributing fac- 358-0432:
tor to significant deficiencies in the management 0f _ _ ....
both Government prime contracts and subcontracts. Small Disadvantaged Business Goal. Congress has
This initiative shailidentify core mandatory training challenged NASA to award eight percent ofits_appro[
priations to Small Disadvantage Business; the goal isareas to be implemented by individual NASA installa-
tions. NASA FAR Supplement coverage on the
required subject matter to, be covered in this training
will be published by December 31, 1993. Point of
contact is Mr. K. Sateriale (202) 358-0491.
Mid-Range Procurement Procedure (Pilot Test Pro-
gram) NASA has developed a new simplified procure-
ment procedure aimed at a third category of procure-
ment (between small purchase and large Agency
acquisitions). The small purchase procedfiFes were
used as the basis, adding only those additional provi-
sions necessary for procurements ranging from
$25,000 to $500,000 (annually). NASA has proposed
this Mid-range Procurement Procedure to OFPP as a
Pilot Program under the innovative procurement ini-
tiative. The OFPP has formally approved the program
with the exception of the electronic bulletin board
which requires Congressional approval. The OFPP is
currently seeking this approval. Marshall Space Flight
Center has been selected as the test site and is imple-
mentinig this procedure. Full implementation is
expecteain December 1993. Point of contact is Mr.
T. Deback (202) 358-0431.
to meet the eight percent level by FY94. To a&om-
plish this goal, NASAs Office of Small and Disadvan[
taged BusinessUtiiization (K) andthe OfflceofPro-
curement (H) have joined together to re-energize
focus on small disadvantaged business contracting and
subcontracting_ Clarified Center and Contract0r
reporting, greater emphasis on subcontracting, and
mandatory goals are all aspects Of the initiative. On
December 1, 1992, the Administrator executed a
Determinations and Findings exercise, settlng aside
more than $300 million in procurement for the
SDBs. The Office of the General Counsel in currently
seeking legislation which will grant NASA the author-
ity to. set aside ,p,rocurements, for SDBs. Point of con-
tact ,s Ms. D. O Nelll (202) 358-0428.
NASA/Industry ProcessAction Team (PAT). A
NASA/Industry PAT has been formed as an opera-
tional working group whose primary function is to
identify real-time, procurement-related issues that
hinder the effectiveness and efficiency of the acquisi-
tion process. The PAT is part of a continuous pro-
gram to bring about improvement in the procure-
ment process. The team will support biennial
NASA/Industry Conferences by developing confer-
Ms. Deidre A. Lee was named Associate Administrator
for procurement on March 11, 1993. She has been act-
ing in that position since early January and had been
De'p tyuAssociate Administrator fi porrocurement since
September 1992. Ms. Lee has been with NASA since July
1984. She has an extensive background in a variety of
military and government procurement positions.
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Segment: The Cost Control Process
During this major topic set, the conferenceprogram shi/_ed fiom larger, Agency-wide overviews and updates to issues
key to program and project managers. The Cost Control Process was *divide'd into the four primary segments of Setting
Requirements, Planning the Projbct, Estimatin_ Costs, and finally Controlling Costs. Following ihese plenary sessions,
panel sessions on the same topics were held to allow participant interaction anal more discussion.
Setting Program Requiremen'ts
Presented by Mark Craig
Space Station Project Office, Johnson Space Center
B ased upon his experience, Craig offered
four suggestions. First, the entire program
team, NASA and contractors, needs to
know requirement "goodness" and "bad-
ness." Criteria for the former include
requirements which are absolutely essential, clear,
concise and unambiguous, qualifiable, verifiable, fea-
sible, consistent with all omer requirements, repre-
senting one thought, hierarchical and traceable.
Requirement "badness" has several attributes, includ-
ing over-specification, TBDs and negative statements
which state that something will not be developed.
Secondly, Craig called for NASA to certify require-
ment writers through course work anaperhaps
apprenticeship. Thirdly, "Mandate a sequenced
approach to requirement development." Begin with a
list of parameters to be controlled, then develop
requirements in %ullet chart" format, and then con-
vert requirements to text. Fourth, Craig advises a con-
tinuing structural analysis of both customer and sys-
tem requirements, with particular attention to
hierarchical "parents" of proposed requirements to
control "requirements creep.
Craig also discussed Concurrent Engineering (CE) as
a state-of-the-art approach for creating an effective
environment in which to generate requirements.
Craigs 10+1 Commandments of CE:
• Create multi-disciplinary, collocated teams
organized by end item
• Emphasize communication, especially with the
customer
• Involve contractors early
• Design support processes concurrently
• Integrate technical reviews
• Create a digital end-item model (common data
base) (eliminates duplicate effort and gives each
team member access to current information)
• Integrate computer-aided engineering tools with
digital end-item model
• Simulate end-item performance
• Simulate manufacturing processes (if appropriate)
• Incorporate lessons learned on previous projects
• Improve process continually
"Concurrent engineering works; its principles are fun-
damentally sound," Craig says, _We should begin now
to make the investment to capture its advantages."
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Major Issues of Program Management Related to
Cost Estimation Practices
by Dr. Humboldt C, Mandell Jr.
Explorations Programs Office, Johnson Space Center
It is believed by many today that human exploration
of the solar system is one of the few missions which
makes NASA unique among government agencies.
Today that mission is severely threatened. It is almost
universally believed that such missions are not afford-
able, and that the U.S. must wait to resume explo-
ration. Budgetary pressures, coupled with the very
high costs of human space missions, have created the
strong perception that it will be many years before the
U.S. can afford to pursue the exploration of the planet
Mars, the Moon, and other extraterrestrial bodies.
This set of perceptions has been largely self-created by
NASA. It is true that substantial increases in the
NASA budget are very unlikely in the foreseeable
future. It is also true that human space missions are
today extremely expensive, particularly when com-
pared to the overall NASA budget. It is further true
that, if human exploration missions continue to
increase in cost, these increases will create the self-ful-
filling condition that exploration is not affordable.
NASA cost estimation methods (based on data from
past and ,_resent programs, from the "manned space
paradigm ) will always lead to the conclusion that we
cannot afford to explore space.
However, it is not true that future space missions
must continue to be as cosdy as previous ones, or that
exploration of Mars must cost more than the original
exploration of the Moon, as was suggested in some
earlier NASA studies. NASA is the victim of its own
costing techniques, which continue to lie to us: it is
possible for missions to Mars to cost hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars, simply because, in our lifetimes, there
will never be hundreds of billions of dollars to spend
on such missions. (And who is interested in things
which happen far beyond one's lifetime?) If NASA is
to continue to have a human exploration mission, and
if the budget cannot be changed, we must change the
management paradigm which has caused the costs to
be high. By benchmarking world-class high technolo-
gy programs, it has been proven that costs can be
reduced to within available budgets.
The ingredients of successful low-cost, high technolo-
gy programs are well known and universally recom-
mended by successful program managers interviewed.
Some "benchmarking lessons learned" include:
• Use government only to define and verify
requirements
• Keep requirements fixed: once requirements are
stated, only relax them; never add new ones
• Place product responsibility in a competitive
private sector
• Specify end results (performance) of products, not
how to achieve the results
• Minimize government involvement (small pro-
gram offices)
• Insure that all technologies are proven prior to the
end of competition
• Utilize the private sector reporting system: reduce
or eliminate specific government reports
• Don't start a program until cost estimates and
budget availability match
• Minimize or eliminate government imposed
changes
• Reduce development time: any program
development can be accomplished in 3 to 4 years
once uncertainties are resolved
• Force people off of development programs when
development is complete
• Incentivize the contractor to keep costs low (as
opposed to CPAF, CPFF)
Use geographic proximity of contractor organiza-
i tions possible (e.g., concurrent engineering)when
To reduce the number of interfaces and keep
responsibilities clean, use the major prime
contractor as the integrating contractor.
NASA has known these principles for many years.
Implementation has been difflcuk.
"Nothing is more difficult to undertake, more perilous to
conduct or more uncertain in its outcome, than to take
the lead in introducing a new order of things. For the
innovator has for enemies all those who have done well
under the old, and lukewarm defenders amongst those
who may do well under the new."
- Machiavelli
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Controlling Costs - The Critical Challenge
The Cost Control Process
by John Hraster
Global Aerospace Science, Goddard Space Flight Center
A recent GAO report said major NASA projects cost 2.
an average of 77 percent more than their initial esti-
mates. More than a third cost more than double the
estimate. The reasons given were technical problems,
budget constraints, redesigns, and other factors. Even
allowing for disagreements on the baseline-for exam-
ple, was the initial estimate a Phase A study or the in- 3.
house estimate for the Phase C/D baseline?-this is still
a lot of money.
Although it may seem like a cliche, the most impor-
tant factors in cost control take place before you get
into implementation. If the requirements are not real-
istic or well defined, you are aiatomatically set up for
problems. They must be minimized to achieve the
mission; anything beyond that will add to cost. Plan-
ning the project involves matching the plan to the
requirements and again minimizing when possible. A
lean, close knit group is the way to go. A lot of people
not only cost a lot but think of other ways to spend
money! Estimating costs must be done with realism. At
this stage it is very easy to forget about the cost of
parts qualification, safety requirements that add cost,
shipping containers, etc. There is a stron_ temptation
to wish some costs away so as not to enaanger a pro-
gram that is just starting. Don't.
.
.
When you reach the implementation l_hase, the
groundwork should have been laid, youve set the 6.
requirements, planned the project, and estimated the
cost. However, there will be holes, the environment
will change, and, above all, there will be problems.
How you handleproblems with the small amount of
discretionary funding you have is the essence of cost
control in this phase. Following are a number of
shared experiences, thoughts, guidelines, etc., that
have worked in the past. The message I want to get
across is how important cost control is and how it is
woven into the fabric of the project along with all the
technical factors. 7.
It is absolutely necessary to be able to say _no.'
This means in all directions; e.g., to Headquar-
ters, to the scientists, to the spacecraft engineers
and contractors. Sometimes tliings look like they
can be done for almost nothing-dont believe it.
Requirements creep must not be allowed. You're
buying the best product for the money, not the
best one that money can buy. If you're going to
advance the state-of-the-art, do it openly, up-
front, with money specified for that purpose,
not contingency money.
The project manager must be a leader first and
manager second. This means staying focused on
the goal and making sure everyone else is
focused on the same goal. It is often necessary to
make tough decisions now that will avoid costs
three years from now. Remember, most projects
fail because of poor management rather than
because of technical problems.
Treat weight, power, and computer memory as
resources just like money. These items translate
directly into dollars if they get out of control. A
strong systems management function is neces-
sary throughout the program to assure require-
ments are met and dont creep upward.
l.
Know what is going on at the cofitractor's plant.
In-plant reps help, but frequent visits by the
observatory manager and others are essential.
Your team members need to be intimately
involved with the work on the floor and make
their own assessments of staffing, shifting, sched-
ule, quality, etc.
It is essential the project financial manager,
observatory manager, and instrument systems
manager work very closely with one another.
The technical managers must understand how
budgets are constructed and contingency funds
allocated. The financial manager must know the
technical risks, assumptions, and bases of esti-
mate for all in-house estimates. These people
should sit down regularly to match the technical
and resource requirements.
A basic ingredient to successful cost control is a
technically strong, self-confident project team.
In the best case the contractor will respond with
an equally strong team. The desirable result is a
mutual respect of the other teams competence,
which makes it much easier to reach technical
solutions through compromise.
. Contingency funds are the only discretionary
funds you have. They are to be used to cover
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,10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
problems within the scope of your work, i.e., to
meet your basic requirements. They are not
meant to cover improvements, new require-
ments, etc.
Do the work as expeditiously as possible. Future
work is always more expensive. It is especially
expensive if it is delayed from a present plan.
If it is necessary to cut back or restructure the
program because of severe problems, you can't
depend on increased efficiency to solve the prob-
lems. Work content must be removed. The
amount of money saved by removing work will
always be less than it was when the work was put
in. Early planning includes preparation o_
descoping plans that can be implemented if you
have serious trouble later.
Streamline the interfai:e with the contractor.
This is especially true in the reporting area. Have
one set of paper do the work of two. For exam-
ple, if they use a set of charts internally when
their subsystem people report monthly to their
program office, these can be used as their
monthly report to your project office. When
possible use the contractor's formats for various
reports, including financial and Performance
Measurement System reports.
It is essential to involve the project scientist,
especially in the decision process. He or she is
the customer on a science satellite and therefore
a stakeholder in project decisions. This person
must help make the tough decisions regardin_
requirements and cost trades, on what is critical
and what is not.
Trust must be established between the project
and the program manager at Headquarters. The
program manager should be invited to all key
project meetings and must be kept fully
informed. This l_ncludes an early warning of
problems even if they are not yet solved.
The award fee process on CPAF contracts must
be used effectively. It is effective as a motivator
only if it is honest, i.e., a 40 is a 40, a 50 is a 50,
anda 90 is a 90. A consistently high score that is
not deserved is not a motivator toward better
15.
performance, and it will not pass Inspector Gen-
eral scrutiny.
Do everything early. Look far ahead. Good plan-
ning can help you make informed choices when
it is still possible to make them, e.g., a make or
buy decision. It can also help you to decide to
change a previous decision in time if circum-
stances have changed.
16. All the principles of TQM are appropriate to the
very dynamic environment of project manage-
ment. By its very nature a project is a team o_r-
ation and the members must be empowerea to
do their jobs and challenged to generate ideas to
improve the whole operation. There must be a
strong interaction between the technical and
business people, and between the government
and contractors, i.e., no walls.
17. Dispose of problems quickly, both technical and
programmatic. Although it is desirable to gather
as much information as possible before making
some decisions, often that is not possible. Often
a non-optimum decision or even a wrong one
made in a timely manner is preferrable to a
delayed one. A wrong one can be reversed. If one
is delayed too long, the worst case is paralysis
and nothing gets done.
18. If changes are necessary to the contracted work
they should be agreed to and discussed up front
with the contractor. There should be no surprises
in the change proposals.
Communicate! Communicate! Communicate!
Take appropriate risk. The operative word is
appropriate. Appropriate risk is obviously differ-
ent for mannedandunmanned missions, and for
A, B and C class unmanned spacecraft. Good
engineering and quality practices must also be
used. However, having said all that there is not
enough money in any project to cover all risks.
Good engineering judgment must be made in
many cases when some uncertainty still exists.
Look for functional redundancy as well as
lanned redundancy,. Consider other ways ofP . • •
operatLng rather than building a perfect
system.
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Setting Requirements
The Cost Control Proc_
A Panel Discussion
Mark Crai_ led the panel on "Setting Requirements, "
joined by _lenn E. Cunningham, Project Manager of the
Mars Observer mission at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
Larry Caddy of Marshall Space Flight Center, and
David Sudduth 39om NASA Headquarters.
Mark Craig told the small group that a fundamental
problem in setting requirements is a long develop-
ment time. In fact, he said, the longer the develop-
ment time, the greater the cost, ana the greater me
risk of detrimental external changes, especially from
the White House and Congress.
The bottom line, according to Craig, is to establish an
effective system engineering process for Phase B.
After all, he pointed out, 80 percent of cost is deter-
mined by the first 10 percent of decisions. Further-
more, changes in Phase C/D may cost hundreds, even
thousands of times more than changes made in Phase
B. Allow no NASA requirement changes once the
" icontract has been set, he adv ses.
Requirements Tools
by Glenn E. Cunningham
Mars Observer Program
Although sometimes referred to as a necessary evil,
requirements are probably a project's most important
element. Typically, a manager is the most concerned
about cost, schedule and performance; however, the
single item which affects allthree aspects is the set of a
projects requirements. Thus, attention to the setting
and maintaining of "good" requirements should be
foremost in the project manager's agenda. There are
number of tools currently available that aid in the
uniform generation, cataloguing, and traceability of
requirements.
At JPL we started in the early 80s the in-house devel-
opment of a requirements capture and hierarchy man-
agement tool called TRACER. While we clearly saw
the value of the tool, its implementation and accep-
tance by the project community had mixed results.
As ,our manager of spacecraft system engineering put
it, We created a germ cell and the antibodies killed
it. We designed a tool for the idealized top-down sys-
tem engineering situation. It captured requirements in
a uniform manner, forced quantitativeness, forced the
establishment of verification requirements, and pro-
vided hierarchical traceables. All the right things. But
the problem is-and I suspect that this occurs with
most real projects-that we have a lot of bottom-up
effects with technology constraints and inheritance
constraints. In addition, we found that the people
assigned to write requirements were generally more
senior, more experienced people who sometimes did
not have the computer skills that younger, less experi-
enced people do, and thus we had an acceptance
problem in using an automated tool with its attendant
structure. We had a user friendliness problem too.
Most problems were in penetrating what we call the
Level 2 requirements, me mission requirements. It
worked better with the hardware requirements, and
exceptionally well with the design verification require-
ments.
But curiously enough, it has been reported that the
tool has found good acceptance in the DoD commu-
nity through distribution by COSMIC. We suspect
that this is because there is more formality and struc-
ture in DoD'S requirements hierarchy than in NASA's.
However, we still believe that automated requirement
management through similar types of tools is the way
of the future. The key is l_robably how to apply them.
Faster' better, cheaper implies less emphasis on
"how to do it" than on the top-down what to do"
and thus on requirements that are capability driven.
Let the tools evolve their user friendliness, and get the
younger, more computer literate people involved.
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Planning the Project
A Panel Discussion
Bill Huber of Marshall Space Flight Center led the
panel, joined by James P. Murphy, Director of Engineer-
ing and Technical Services at Ames Research Center,
Thomas E. Huber, Director of Engineering at Goddard
Space Flight Center, and Michael R. Luther, Program
Manager of the Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite at
NASA Headquarters.
Bill Huber spoke on the results of the recent Project
Planning Institutional Team, chaired by Jack Lee,
designed to reduce both cost and technical risk in new
NASA projects. He pointed to inadequate Phase B
definition and unrealistic dependence on unproven
technology as major cost drivers which can be elimi-
nated or reduced with proper project planning.
communicating; treating the people involved with
respect; empowering them to solve problems at the
lowest possible level; and preserving those qualities
that have made NASA great: a high degree of techni-
cal expertise, attention to detail, a thorough test pro-
gram, professionalism and technical performance.-
Cost and schedule would flow from productivity ini-
tiatives, especially the following:
Lead engineers are responsible for technical
performance, cost and schedule of their systems
(while the j3roject management directorate is
responsible rot mission anainstrument cost, over-
all schedule control, and project management).
Jim Murphy noted that while,,NASA's technical per-
formance could be rated as very good, cost and
schedule are rated as "poor," mostly of our own doing.
"Better planning starts at the top and flows down," he
says, defining the slogan of cheaper/better/faster as
"do it right the first time."
Two sp,,ecific areas Murphy chose for comment were
major scope" additions and cost flow-down. The Lee
report indicated that the best projects were stable in
allkey elements of late Phase B/Phase C: science tech-
Cost history is shown on the same charts as
schedules, which are part of the technical progress
reporting.
• Commonality of design was emphasized by the
team in fixed-price hardware, software and data
system design.
Early planning on XTE allowed for an efficient parts
program, based upon expansion of standard" parts,
thus reducing cost and schedule. =
nologies, team members, implementation approach
and institutional factors. The"scope" changes cauSing Mike Luther of the Flight Systems=Division in the
the worts cost/schedule problems (comparabilein
magnitude) were the addition of a major instrument,
a complete change of proejct team and implementa-
tion plan, and major canges in a parts program. 'It
takes time to fully understand the cost/schedule
results of a major change," he noted.
Murphy also said that the best projects flowed cost
requirements to the system and subsystem levels, both
at the contractors and NASA. These cost require-
ments are just as important as the flow-down of tech-
nical performance requirements.
Tom Huber described the X-Ray Timing Explorer
(XTE) project at Goddard as a pilot program for new
management approaches to enhance productivity that
would set examples for other programs." Principles of
Total Quality Management were employed on XTE,
including common sense management in terms of
organizing work, streamlining procedures and
Office of Mission to Planet Earth described the for_
mat and content of the Program Commitment Agree-
ment (PCA), a new way of doing business at NASA.
The PCA is a two-way agreement between the NASA
Administration and the program Associate Adminis-
trator, who defines the technical and schedule com-
mitments to be accomplished within the annual fund-
ing and institutional resources made available by the
Administrator. Certain boundary conditions and
assumptions are spelled out in the PCA, such as
launch and space communications services, specifying
both customers and suppliers. The PCA lists all inter-
nal agreements (within NASA) necessary to execute
the program, and any external agreements with other
agencies, Congress or international partners. If a com-
mitment cannot be met, whether technical or sched-
ule, or in terms of resources, the Administrator or the
Associate Administrator must notlf_ the other and
renegotiate the terms of the PCA.
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Estimating Costs
The Cost Control Process
A Panel Discussion
Hum Mandell led the third concurrent panel, with
Edwin Dean of Langley Research Center, Dr. Guy
Fogleman, Manager of Advanced Programs in the
Programs and Flight Missions Branch, Life Sciences
Division at NASA Headquarters, and Dave Pine of the
Orifice of the CFO/Comptroller at NASA Headquarters.
"According to our cost models," says Mandell, "we are
out of business! Costs are determined by our manage-
ment paradigm. For him, NASA must reduce the
costs of programs to enable space exploration to
continue. Low-cost high technology programs are
understood by NASAprogram managers but imple-
mentation has been difflcuk, Mandell says.
He cited four overriding themes in the realm of
lessons learned. After compiling many, many lessons
learned, Mandell found the following major themes:
Theme 1-The "learning of lessons learned" is not
enough in itself to effect a change. There must be a
dedicated effort put forth. Some of the quotes of
lessons learned under this theme were "change will
not happen by itself," "obvious mistakes and weak-
nesses nave been repeated," and "plan the change; a
deliberate process of planning is vital.
Theme 2-The way we structure and manage our con-
tracts provides the largest potential leverage for change
and management gain within the space cultural para-
digm. Some comments under this theme were:
"incentivize the contractor to keep costs low," "bid-
ding pressures influence accuracy and risk," "explore
fee arrangement to place more emphasis on perfor-
mance.
Theme 3-The typical NASA bureaucratic manage-
ment organization, structure, and style does not pro-
mote the efficiency and innovation required for suc-
cessful management. "Lessons" cited were: "establish
clear understanding of roles, responsibilities, and
authority, .... provide open communication in all direc-
tions," "motivate all to succeed, " "stress delegation of
responsibility," and "(have) flexible organizational
structure and management systems."
Theme 4-Programs should begin only when there is a
balance between technical content and readiness,
schedules, and budget availability and support. The
high points listed here were realistic.., budgets...
must be set to avoid w_isted management energy,"
"don't start a program until cost estimates and budget
available match," and "ensure all technologies are
proven prior to the end of competition."
Cost Trading System (CTS): An Investment in the Future
Presented by Dr. Guy Fogleman
Advanced Programs, Life Sciences Division
In the late 1980s life science projects began changing
in response to increased demands for human perfor-
mance in space. As projects and missions were becom-
ing more robust and complex, they also became
expensive and risky, and it became more difficult to
defend program costs. Existing cost models were not
representative of Life Sciences, and attempts at col-
lecting relevant data for cost modeling were not suc-
cessful. The lesson for Life Sciences, a lesson that is
being learned repeatedly within NASA, is that histori-
cal cost data is the key to success in this critical area.
The approach pursued in the development of the
CTS was first to place priority on collecting the
largest program costs, then eventually to cover the
entire life-cycle costs for project and mission activities.
Thus, CTS was developed by Guy Fogleman, Joe
Fuller (Futron) and Don Strope (Cost, Inc.) in the
following order'.p rime contracts, support service
contracts, civil service direct labor and Phase B stud-
ies. The expansion of CTS to the later two is currently
in process. To the extent possible, CTS relies on the
well-understood and utilized WBS and NASA 533
Financial Reporting System to collect costs. WBS
end-items and their costs, as well as technical and
programmatic data are captured for future applica-
tion. A program-wide policy is in effect requiring
CTS be applied to Life Sciences project/mission
procurements greater than $500K. An unplanned
result from CTS development has been a greater
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appreciationby Headquartersand Field Center per-
sonnel not only of the value of cost data to the plan-
ning of future projects, but also to the management of
current ones.
An Agency standard for CSTs could result in benefits
similar to those expected by Life Sciences across
NASA and the aerospace industry. Cheaper, faster,
better will require changes in the way we do business
and greater investment to obtain those changes. One
thing is certain, progress in cost estimation and cost
management must occur before NASA can truly claim
excellence for its program management. CTS could be
the beginning of understanding how to find the com-
mon ground that will allow sharing of tools, informa-
tion and intelligence to advance the state-of-the-art in
cost estimation and cost management.
Controlling Costs
A Panel Discussion
John Hraster led the fourth concurrent session on the Cost
Control Process. He was joined by Richard A. Austin,
Deputy Associate Director for Earth Observing System
(EOS) Resources Management at Goddard Space Flight
Center, Kenneth A. Sateriale, Procurement Analyst in the
Contract Management Division at NASA Headquarters,
and Sandra C. Coleman, the Assistant Project manager
and Business Manager of the Space Shuttle Redesigned
Solid Rocket Motor project af Marshall Flight Center.
John Hraster showed how cost control is woven into
the project along with the technical factors. He noted
how there used to be a saying that no project manager
would be criticized if the project overran, as long as
the mission was technically successful. This is chang-
ing, the Agency is changing, the country is changing.
The challenge now will be "You've shown us you can
do it, now show us you can do it within budget." Or,
as Professor K. Pederson of Georgetown said recently,
"Reality has now intruded in the space program."
Dan Goldin said in a recent interview, "I took a look
at the NASA budget, and I was shocked. The run-out
was enormous and you know what the amazing thing
was? We werent going to start a significant number of
new things-we just had a lot of things in the chute."
We need to understand anytime we overrun we take
away from a new program that hasn't started. We're
not in a position to say, "Well I've done the best I can,
but we overran so give me some more money." The
answer could well be to descope or cancel.
Ken Sateriale described key points in the new award
fee policy. After the approvalof the procurement offi-
cer, there is no rollover of fee on service contracts, and
the fee for non-service contracts is based upon total
performance,, depending upon the final, comprehen-
sive rating. Cost control must be emphasized in all
evaluations," he said. Performance incentives are
required on hardware contacts over $25 million, with
a mandatory, uniform, simplified scoring system.
Sandy Coleman reported that three-fourths of NASA
contract dollars are presently award fee; this provides
the government maximum technical oversight but
lends itself to minimum cost control. Prior to Chal-
lenger, most Shuttle contracts had been converted to
straight incentive structure; this provides opportuni-
ties rot lowest cost but provides minimum technical
control, as was determined to be a flaw by the Chal-
lenger Commission. Therefore, all Shuttle contracts
were converted back to Award Fee. About two years
ago, the incentive contracting approach was revived.
Since the RSRM Office was ver_ sensitive to past crit-
icisms of incentivizing cost tamer then quality, they
devised an award fee/incentive fee structure with a
quality gate minimum score required to share in any
of the incentive fee pool. This is working to reduce
RSRM cost and is consistent with the new initiatives
that are being proposed for all NASA contracts.
"Cost control to me means cost reduction," says Cole-
man, and "the one singlegreatest contribution you or
I can make as an individual in reducing costs is to
penetrate every line item in our budget. She also sug-
gests challenging all cost estimates, all "value added"
of each activity, to understand cost and to make the
contractor self-conscious about every dollar spent. She
concludes: I bet you would be surprised at the con-
tractor reports which never get challenged. I believe
we can make a difference by simply penetrating data."
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Systems Engineering Steering Group
Special Interest Topics
A Panel Discussion
Bill Morgan of Johnson Space Center led the Systems
En ineering Steering Group, accom_p,anied by Dr Mikeg , * °
Ryschkewitsch, Chief of the Systems Engmeermg Office at
Goddard Space Flight Center, J. Milam Walters who
manages the development of a project engineering data-
base at Langley Research Center for Internet worldwide,
and Anthony D. Fragomeni, Associate Chief of the Sys-
tems Engineering Office at Goddard.
Bill Morgan presented an overview of current Systems
Engineering Steering Group (SESG) activities includ-
ing the publication of a draft NASA Systems Engineer-
ing Handbook, edited at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
and Readings in Systems Engineering, edited by Frank
Hoban and William Lawbaugh, with preprint copies
made available to the participants. Morgan said Sys-
tems Engineering Working Groups are being formed
at each NASA Center to define and improve the
process and methods of systems engineering, integrat-
ed tools, career development and communications. In
addition, Special Interest Groups are being formed to
serve as intercenter product development teams.
NASA today is challenged by increased program
complexity and duration, plus reduced resources,"
says Morgan. To meet theses challenges, we must
increase the effectiveness of the Agency by:
• Develol_ing compatibility among the Field
Centers processes for program management,
program control and system engineering
• Improving the effectiveness of the civil cervice
work force in executing these processes
• Enhancing the workforce collaboration through-
out the Agency
° Increasing the future effectiveness by developing a
continuous process improvement program.
Tony Fragomeni added "some food for thought." He
said: "It is taken as axiom that what has worked well
in the past is the best starting point for future
improvements. There is a correlation between a fully
adequate mission design process and a successful
Phase C/D. Phase C/D cost overruns usually occur
because of a lack of understanding of requirements,
inadequate, definition of. requirements or changin., g
requirements, both technically and programatlcally.
Current SESG Activities
I
Process &
Methods
• JSC SEIP (Complete)
• MSFC SE Handbook
(Complete)
• JPL SE Handbook
(Complete)
• GSFC Mission Design
Process (Complete)
• SEPIT (In Progress)
• TIVIT (Proposed)
• Continuous Process
Improvement (Proposed)
• CE (Requested)
System EngineeringWorking Groups
I
I
IntegratedTools ]
• jsc Integrated CASE
Environment (Proposed)
• LaRC EDB Prototype (In
Progress)
• JPL Tool Summary (Complete)
• JSC Tool Surrm'tary (In
Progress)
I
CareerDevelopment
• SE&I Career Ladder (In
Progress)
• SE&I Curriculum (In
Development)
• SE&I (Proposed)
• QFD (In Development)
• DYSE Dynamic System
Engineering (Ongoing)
• CSM SE Course (Ongoing)
• Jim French System
Engineering Course
(Proposed)
Communications
• NASA SE&I Newsletter
(Proposed)
* Readings in System Engineering
(Ongoing)
• Lessons Learned Data Base
(Ongoing)
• SE Bulletin Board (Ongoing)
• SE Symposia (Ongoing)
• SE&I Video Lecture Series
(Ongoing)
- SEWG Videocor_ (Ongoing)
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Program Control Steering Group
A Panel Discussion
Dave Pine led the Program Control Steering Group pre-
sentation, joined by ]ames E. Bone, the Agency-wide
integrator for program control improvement, a part of the
NASA Program Project Management Initiative, and
Paul A. Mowatt, Deputy Director of the Flight Projects
Directorate for planning and business management at the
Goddard Space Flight Center.
The panel discussed the program objectives for the
program control network: Strengthen current man-
agement and train the next generation of project man-
agement personnel in program control subjects."
They plan to accomplish this objective through skill
courses, handbooks, and efforts in career planning
and development. Their approach is to assign a full-
time integrator and involve Center and Headquarters
key personnel, such as program control managers and
Center comptrollers. NASA experts will be tapped to
develop and deliver training materials and incorporate
them into Center training programs.
Program/Project Management And Control Life
Cycle/Occupational Relationship
Phase A
Analysis
Phase B
Definition
Phase C
Design
NASA
PROJECT
LIFE
CYCLE
Phase D
Development
Phase E
Operations
Overview of
PM&C Functions
Plans & Requirements
Schedule Management
Resource Management
Data & Info. Management
Configuration Management
Integration and Analysis
Con tract Engineering
Performance Assessment
Integrated Skills
Training Courses
Work Breakdown Structure
Program Logic & Scheduling
Parametric Cost Estimating
Configuration Management
Procurement for Technical
ram Control
RFP Preparation
Source Evaluation Board
ysis
Proposal Evaluations
."Analysis
Performance Measurement
Project Analyst's Cost and
Schedule Analysis
Resources
To Perform
HANDBOOKS
Plans &
_, Requirements _
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International Cooperation
Segment:: International Cooperation
Roles and Strategies in International Programs
By Peter G. Smith
International Affairs, International Relations Division
M ore than 1,200 agreements with over
130 countries and international
organizations have been negotiated
by NASA in the past 30 years. In
fact, noted Smith, international
cooperation is mandated by the Space Act of 1958.
The benefits of such cooperation has been monetary
(more than $12 billion contributed or pledged),
strategic (access to foreign expertise and facilities) and,
of course, political. The downsides, however, include
management complexity, technical and programmatic
risk and, of course, political risks. On balance, NASA
programs have been greatly enriched and strengthened
with international cooperation, Smith noted.
As far as program and project managers are con-
cerned, Smith urged specific division of responsibility
with international partners. Management structure
and responsibilities must be made clear from the start,
augmented by clear reporting documentation and
monitoring.
Help in international expertise, coordination with
other agencies and skilled negotiators are readily avail-
able to the project manager from the' International
Relations Division. International Relations is orga-
nized by both functional area and major cooperative
partner, including special relationships with Russia.
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An Overview of NPO Energia/NASA Commercial Relations
by Jeffrey Manber
Energia USA
"Space holds a special place inour psyche," said Man-
ber, who wondered,aloud if aerospace is going the
way of steel or autos in terms of international consor-
tia. "America has lost the soul, the drive to get back to
space," Manber asserted, and the motive has instead
become mired in litigation. He questioned why
NASA does not use the Mir space station, for exam-
ple. "It does not have to be the pinnacle" of technolo-
gy and hygiene, "just representative," he said. Finally,
in defense of Energia being what NASA may call "a
_tuasi-commercialorganization," Manber asked:
How private is theprivate sector when Rockwell gets
most of its dollars from NASA and the U.S. govern-
ment?"
He added: "The Russians are not going to go away.
Theyre not going to make just toasters and refrigera-
tors . . . It seems very clear that the space industry is
going the way of the automobile industry and the
steel industry. And it's going to be international. And
you'll have 20 percent equity ownership from a XYZ
company, and 15 percent from the Russian govern-
ment, and 18 percent from J.P. Morgan...
"Robert Reich, the Secretary of Labor, said recently
the very idea of an American economy is becoming
meaningless. As are the notions of American corpora-
tion, American capital, American products, and
American technology.
"And so, you know I would say to you that even
though you are all government people, that one of the
strongest new commercial markets in the aerospace
space arena is in the capabilities of the former Soviet
Union. I think that at some point industry is going to
be moving in. I think that will give us a more robust
capab!!ity. It will lower the costs of doing business in
space.
International shared Experiences
Dr. Steven Holt, Director of Space Sciences at Goddard
Space Flight Center, led. this panel, with Gil Ousley of
BDM Federal, Robert McBrayer, Task Team Manager of
the Lunar Ultraviolet Telescope Experiment (LUTE) at
Marshall Space Flight Center, and Joseph Alexander,
Associate Director of Space Sciences at Goddard Space
Flight Center.
A Panel Discussion
International Project Management
by Gilbert W. Ousley, Sr.
Former NASA European Representative
The basic bible for a NASA International Project
Manager is the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) or the Letter of Agreement (LOA) that out-
lines the basic responsibilities of each participant and
authorizes the project managers to carry out the exe-
cution of these responsibilities. The MOU/LOA is
not a contract but an agreement between partners to
use their best efforts to conduct their part of the,pro-
gram. This agreement is executed on the basis or no-
exchange-of-funds.
The key relationships for the project manager are
with the NASA project scientist, the NASA program
manager and the co-project manager in me other
country. Joint ,project management is "very much
like a marrialge where each partner brings some-
thing essential to the combined team, and a success-
ful relationship requires the practices of flexible
understanding and patience. Careful recognition
and consideration of each partners contribution
must take place continuously (as in a marriage), and
International Cooperation
a strong feeling of mutual dependence and trust is
required to navigate the many difficulties (including
cost) jointly affecting both sides in an interdependent
manner. Neither project manager should dominate
the relationship with a foreign counterpart regardless
of the proportions of the individual countrys contri-
bution, and persuasion is the preferred tactic of total
successes. At the end of a scientifically successful pro-
gram, each side should be eager to continue the same
relationships into future cooperation.
Clear, simple and definable hardware and software
interfaces must exist near the beginning of a project,
and some means of verification (usually with an engi-
neering model) should be exercised as early as possible
in the project's life. A Joint Working Group, co-
chaired by the project manager, that meets on a regu-
lar/specified schedule (every four or six months) and
which produces timely, minutes containing discus-
sions, agreements, anaaction items (with assignees
and due dates) is essential. Interactions must be dis-
cussed openly and objectively, and resolved in a mutu-
ally satisfactory manner. All scientific data should
eventually be made available in a form suitable for
analysis to the National Science Data Center for dis-
tribution to the international science community.
Successful cooperative projects in which the scientific
objectives are clearly met in a harmonious, timely and
cost effective manner do not just happen; they are
made to happen.
International Scientific Payloads
by Robert O. McBrayer
LUTE Task Team Manager, Goddard Space Flight Center
Serving as Assistant Mission Manager for the Spacelab
One and Spacelab Three Shuttle/Spacelab Interna-
tional Missions was excellent preparation for assign-
ment as the Mission Manager for the First Interna-
tional Microgravity Laboratory (IML-I)
Spacelab/Shuttle Mission. This seven-year project
involved NASA and other international space agen-
cies, over 200 science investigators from 14countries,
and over 42 different investigations.
data, by U.S. investigators. The Letter of Agreement
established a framework for the development of a
detailed interface agreement between the experiment
developer and mission management. The mission
manager then utilized existing mission documentation
(i.e., Instrument Interface Agreement and Operations
and Integration Agreement) to establish requirements
for the integration of each experiment into the IML-I
payload.
As Mission Manager of the IML-I Mission, I have
had to deal with continual pressure to minimize the
cost increases associated with Shuttle manifest
changes, continually balancing budget, schedule, tech-
nical complexity and the scientific requirements and
desires of the scientific community, while interacting
with five other NASA Centers and five international
space agencies. A Letter of Agreement was signed by
International Relations and identified the program
managers and the program scientists for each Agency
(i.e., NASA and ESA). This Letter of Agreement
established the conditions of participation for the for-
eign partner and the specific duties of each Agency.
For IML-i, NASA provided the flight opportunity for
a foreign partners hardware developers and science
investigators in exchange for use of their apparatus, or
Interaction with foreign partners (management, scien-
tists, and experiment developers) on IML-I was an
extremely positive experience. International coopera-
tion dictates the understanding of other cultures and
sensitivity to communications. A good understanding
of the schedule, technical and resource interfaces is a
necessity for communicating with the language and
cultural challenges facing personnel on both sides.
Straightforward relationships were a key aspect of suc-
cessful interaction with the foreign partners on IML-I.
These same principles can be equally applied to inter-
action with any partner, foreign or domestic, on any
project. There is no real substitute for a clear, unam-
biguous planning, understanding of the other part-
ners constraints and needs, and straightforward rela-
tionships in any successful program or project.
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Segment: Agency Relations
Conference attendees were invited to participate in two concurrentpanels on Agency Relations. Dr. Scott Pace led the
panel on Inter-Agency Cooperation, with Dr. Fenton Carey jgom the U.S. Department of Energy, Beth Masters39om
the U.S. Department of Defense and Tyrone C. Taylor of the Policy Coordination Division in the NASA Office of Pol-
icy Coordination and International Relations.
Kathryn Schmoll led the panel on Intra-Agency Cooperation with Vernon Weyers, Director of Flight Projects at God-
dard Space Flight Center, George Levin, Chief of Advanced Systems in the Office of Space System Development at
NASA Headquarters, and Thomas H. Cochran, Director of Space Flight Systems at Lewis Research Center.
Inter-Agency Relations
by Dr. Scott Pace
Office of Space Commerce, Department of Commerce
S ome of you here today may find yourselves
in inter-agency negotiations or trying to
understand the negotiation process. The
Office of Space Commerce is responsible
for policy coordination on all space-related
issues and activities in the Department of Commerce.
The Department is not a space agency the way
NASA is; rather it is like the Department of Defense
in that man_' of its activities are dependent on space
systems or they impact the space activities of others.
NOAA operates weather satellites, the Bureau of
Export Administration regulates the export of some
space technologies, the International Trade Adminis-
tration promotes trade in space goods and services,
and the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion agency influences international telecommunica-
tions policy and spectrum allocations.
Space, more than other issues, tends to cut across tra-
ditional agency boundaries. One of the useful results
of the Space Council has been the creation of good
working relations, and sometimes personal friend-
ships, among the agency representatives. How will
space policy issues and those inter-agency relations
fare now that the Council has been eliminated
(again)? Non-military space issues have been nominal-
ly sent to the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP), yet space issues are not just technology-relat-
ed. The National Economic Council (NEC) and the
National Security Council (NSC) both have equities
at stake in many space issues. OSTP and the NSC
may extend themselves into economic issues or there
may be ad hoc blends of these White House organiza-
tions as specific space topics arise.
The demise of the National Space Council signals an
interest by the new Administration in folding space
into broader science and technology themes and not
focusing on it as a separate, special entity as it has
been since Sputnik. This reflects a number of forces
such as the end of the Cold War, the integration of
space activities into many routine civil, military, and
commercial activities, and the need to ensure U.S.
government support of science and technology is
rationally integrated with other national interests.
These forces are likely to make inter-agency coopera-
tion and competition more important than ever.
Agencies may find themselves having to work out
things on their own more without a White House
space staffer forcing an agreement.
If inter-agency negotiations are done well and in ways
that find creative solutions to conflicts, the agencies
participating can look strong and competent. If nego-
tiations are done poorly, agencies can look weak,
incompetent, or at best narrow-minded. None of
these perceptions is likely to be helpful in winning
support from the White House, Congress, the Ameri-
can people, or other countries. Successful, inter-a_ency
negotiation is more than just being tough, but
requires a blend of many skills, knOwing when to be
confrontational (rarely), when and how to compro-
mise, and when not to say or do anything at all. As
told to me by one experienced agency representative:
"Do you want to score points or do you want to win?
The two are not the same." Success means having
agency leaders and managers thinking clearly about
goals and strategies. For the project manager trying to
navigate in a world very different from Apollo, it
means deciding if you want to be an agent of positive
change or irrelevant.
In politics, it is often said that timing is everything.
Thus one of the most subtle questions is knowing
when to engage in inter-agency negotiations ana
when not to. In the past, there have been reviews of
virtually every major space policy topic, such as the
future of space transportation, the Landsat program,
and procurement reform. In my own experience,
space transportation and international cooperation
26
Agency Relations
have been two themes that seem to come up the most
often.
In the future, there will be inter-agency discussions of
global environmental monitoring dealing with nation-
al security, economic, and foreign policy issues that go
beyond the scientific questions. I expect there to be a
greater emphasis on integratinag space technology. .
issues into the broader technology pohcy of th_s
Administration and finding more opportunities for
commercial applications. Aeronautics is slated for
increased emphasis, and NASAs past efforts in this
area are often cited as a model of what might be done
with other industries, both inside and outside of the
traditional aerospace community.
It should come as no surprise that the drivers for space
policy today are limited government budgets, the
defense draw-down conversion and the need for
stronger economic growth. Space projects will find
themselves facing increasingly stiff criteria not only in
terms of how scientifically productive they are, but
how they contribute to the technical and managerial
strength of U.S. industry. In a period of budgetary
stagnation or even reductions, I would urge caution in
pulling work in-house. Government needs industry as
a partner, not just as a contractor, and that means
sharing the pain of reductions while looking for new
cooperative opportunities.
Inter-agency negotiations will play a significant role in
structuring space policies and budget priorities that fit
todays realities. NASA managers will therefore need
to learn how to anticipate the needs and outcomes of
these negotiations. This means thinking beyond tradi-
tional NASA communities in the search for allies and
supporters. Tl_e very successful manager wiiliikel);be
the one who has a vision of how to meet the needs of
more than one agency and is able to use inter-agency
agreements to reinforce the objectives of his or her
program.
Some of you may find yourselves in inter-agency
negotiations or trying to understand the negotiation
process. If so, I have some personal suggestions that
hopefully may make you more effective. However, I
do not make any claim to having followed my own
advice.
• The first rule of diplomacy is to maintain friendly,
respectful relations and open lines of communica-
tion with allparties. Make courtesy calls to intro-
duce yourself.
The signal-to-noise ratio in policy debates is very
low. Try to stick to a few, simple principles in
articulating why you support a position. Try to be
clear about what conditions could cause you to
change your position.
Look for leverage points in creating coalitions
with other agencies, such as budget concerns or
complementary missions. Establish internal and
external stockholders in policy so that implemen-
tation happens; do not rely on top-down direc-
tives.
Support studies that look ahead to future scenar-
ios and try to map out alternative scenarios for
how budgets, international relations and technol-
ogy may develop. Remember the importance of
fairness and credibility, especially if you are lead-
ing a negotiation. A perception of unfairness is
what often leads to press leaks, Congressional
inquiries, and even legal action. Above all, you
must know what your principals will or cannot
support and how far they will go. This means
knowing the constituency for your agency and not
exposing your principal (i.e., saying he or she will
support some action) unless you have clearance to
do so. High-level meetings are not the best places
to have surprises and free-ranging arguments.
Have those discussions off-line and be able to pre-
dict what other agencies will say before the big
meetings happen.
Dr. Scott Pace is the Senior Technical and Policy Analyst
for the space issues in the Office of the Deputy-Secreta-ry
of Commerce. He represents the Department in inter-
agency working groups and advisory committees on civil,
military and commercial space matters.
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Intra-Agency Relations
by Thomas H. Cochran
Space Flight Systems. Lewis Research Center
In September of last year NASA took the first step in
returning the U.S. to the planet Mars since 1975
when the Viking Spacecraft landed on the barren
planet. A Titan III rocket launched the Mars Observer
Spacecraft together with its upper stage, the Transfer
Orbit Stage, called TOS, from the Kennedy Space
Center. The launch culminated an intense develop-
ment effort for the spacecraft as well as the TOS that
took five years to complete. Numerous problems were
overcome in the spacecraft instruments, the checkout
of the TOS at the Cape, and the processing of the
spacecraft. On top of all this, the launch was the first
to occur at Launch Complex 40, a facility that was
completely rebuilt in the span of just two years. Here
are the major players involved, including NASA,
other Government agencies, and those from private
industry who worked on the project.
Within NASA:
• JPL managed the spacecraft development-Mar-
shall managed the development of the TOS
• Lewis managed the Titan III commercial launch
services andthe integration of the stack on the
pad
• Kennedy oversaw the ground processing and
launch of the integrated vehicle
• NASA Headquarters, Code S, managed and
advocated both the Spacecraft and Launch
Vehicle
Other Government members of the team:
• Air Force Division managed the reconstruction of
Launch Complex 40
• The Air Force at Cape Canaveral provided
processing and launch facilities, safety support
and weather support
Private industry participants:
General Electric developed the spacecraft
Martin Marietta developed the TOS and provided
the Titan III launch services
• Orbital Sciences managed the TOS development
at Martin Marietta
• Bechtel constructed Launch Complex 40
The question we have to ask today, "What can we do
to improve our relationships even further?" The fol-
lowing suggestions encourage discussion:
First, Centers need to concentrate on working on
those things they do best, fine tuning their already
considerable skills to be the best there are. Strategies
to "cover the waterfront" and to invest in marginal
areas on the margin and which cause conflicts with
other organizations should be stopped.
Second, explore the value of personnel exchanges
between Centers for periods up to a year. A Center
Professional Development Program would permit per-
sonal relationships to be developed that would in turn
improve communications and break down igno-
rance" barriers.
Third, sister Center managers needs to engage in
"Information Exchanges" on a regular basis. Struc-
tured home and away "Love Ins" and/or videocons
that concentrate on areas of common interest, as well
as contention, could result in agreements that enhance
each Centers ability to accomplish its role as well as
clear the air.
And finally, Centers need to develop strategic alliances
with other Centers to both supplement and comple-
ment capabilities in program areas of common inter-
est. These agreements need to be formal, reviewed on
a regular basis, serve as the basis for common techni-
cal progress review, and forged by each Center's Senior
Management Council.
In conclusion, what the future holds for the NASA
community can at best be described today as uncer-
tain. The changes that have occurred in the world
militarily and economically will have a profound
impact on what we do and how we do it. Make'rio
mistake, things are going_t0 chang_._'agroup we
have the power through our varied and immense
talents andthe tools we have at our di_0sal to have a
significant impact on the future or this country.
However, this will only happen if we put aside our
parochial interests and utilize the teams and coopera-
tion we have demonstrated to be so powerful.
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Industry, Government and University Parmerstn'_
Se ment: Industry, Government and
,g ..........
University-: Partnerships
Commercializing U.S. Technology
by John Preston
Technology Licensing, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
U niversities in the U.S. have a signifi-
cant impact on business through the
transfer of technology. This transfer
takes various forms, including faculty
communications (such as lecturing
and publishing of research results), faculty consulting
activities, and the direct transfer of technology
through the licensing of patents, copyrights and other
intellectual property to industry.
Well-trained students and professional staff who leave
the university to work in industry probably represent
the universities greatest transfer of technology. These
persons stimulate creativity and bring new ideas and
perspectives to industry.
Perhaps the most dramatic form of technology trans-
fer from universities is the creation of new businesses.
A 1988 study ofMIT spinoffcompanies by the Bank
of Boston revealed that its personnel and technology
were involved in 636 companies located in Massachu-
setts. In 1988, these companies employed over 20,000
Massachusetts residents, with annual revenues of
$39.7 billion. Had all of these revenues been within
Massachusetts, it would have amounted to about one-
third of the Commonwealths economy. A 1989 study
by Chase Manhattan Bank identified 225 MIT spin-
off companies in Silicon Valley with annual revenues
of over $22 billion. A study of Stanford spinoff com-
panies would probably show similarly impressive eco-
nomic impact.
Regional economies receive a double benefit from
these high tech, spinoff companies. Several studies
have indicated that for every high technology job cre-
ated, four or five low tech jobs (retailing, government,
hotels, construction...) are also created.
Companies founded by MIT people include Digital
Equipment, Raytheon, Analog Devices, Lotus Devel-
ol_ment, Intel, Genentech and several other large
businesses. Many MIT spinoff companies achieve
tremendous growth rates. Such companies are often
characterized by the following: seed financial invest-
ment secured from a quality source of capital; talented
entrepreneurs with diverse and complementary man-
agement backgrounds; and a core technology with
broad applicability, numerous products, and consider-
able growth potential. These companies seem to play
an enormous role in stimulating the economy and
creating jobs.
International competitive factors are forcing America
to wake up to the importance of encouraging technol-
ogy transfer and the creation of high tech companies.
The U.S. spends more on research and development
than any other country. In fact, its research expendi-
tures are roughly equal to the combined research of
Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France.
The U.S. Government has recognized the importance
of domestically capturing the value added of our
research, and numerous laws have been Massed that
streamline technology transfer. The net effect is that
there has been enormous growth in formalized tech-
nology transfer from U.S. research institutions to
industry in the last five years. Universities and govern-
ment laboratories have become much more aggressive
in finding mechanisms to get their technology com-
mercialized, no longer relying only on publishing
research results and transferring trained people.
The passion of various players is the key determinant
of success. Worded differently, any new business will
encounter hundreds of barriers before it succeeds.
People with no passion will use the first barrier as
excuse for failure, while people with high passion will
do whatever it takes to overcome the barriers.
There are many, ways to kill the passion, but greed
takes first place. Greed in the form of equity distrib-
ution is probably the single largest barrier to creating
companies. All players in a new company are trying to
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maximizetheir ownership.Often investors feel they
should own 100 percent of the company. These peo-
ple push very hard for a high stock price when they
raise venture capital. This behavior typically drives
them to raise money from secondary sources (rela-
tives, wealthy friends or unsophisticated investors).
This lowers the quality of the investor. Second, very
stingy incentive stock plans for their employees again
attract second-rate players. Worse yet, in addition to
getting second-rate employees and investors, the pas-
sion of the employees and investors fades rapidly as
they come to realize that the probability is small that
they will make significant money from the overvalued
stock they acquired. This means the employees will be
unwilling to work long, hard hours and the investors
will not be willing to come forward when (not if) the
company needs more money.
Greed can take many other forms. Within a large
company, equity is not the primary motivator because
it is much less likely to make significant gains. How-
ever, credit for good performance is a key incentive.
Managers who claim all the credit when anything
good happens and dodge the blame when problems
arise are killing the passion of the employees under
them.
Other killers of passion include destructive criticism.
Many groups of individuals are dedicated to criticiz-
ing plans toprevent mistakes. For example, the Food
and Drug Administration is designed more toprevent
a drug which does not perform to standards from
reaching the general public than to facilitate getting
new helpful drugs to market. Within companies,
committees and lawyers provide the watchdog func-
tion. These people serve an important function much
like the brakes on your car, but often can have devas-
tating effects on the early stages of any new business
development. The psychology of these individuals is
that when their advice is sought over some new busi-
ness idea they can only take credit for "preventing a
negative event" rather than "facilitating a positive."
Worded differently, they cannot take credit for the
original idea, only finding its problems. A large dose
of criticism kills passion.
Start-up companies and technology transfer to exist-
ing companies will continue to play a major role in
economic development. The positive impact from
new business creation can be increased by targeting
appropriate technologies; finding strong managers
and quality investors or sponsors; enhancing the
image or credibility of the business; and finally
encouraging passionate behavior by the key players
toward the success of the new business. These quali-
ties, coupled with a well written, balanced agreement
and good will on the part of both the licensee and
licensor, will greatly enhance the likelihood for success
of the venture and rewards to the licensor.
John T. Preston is the Director of Technology Develop-
ment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
As Director, he manages the Technology Licensing O_ce,
which is responsible for patenting licensing of MIT Lin-
coln Laboratory and Whitehead Institute inventions and
software.
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Technology Transfer: A NASA Model
Kevin Barquinero, Director of the 3p_Sace Commerce
Opportunities Office, was joined by Carol A. Ginty of
Lewis Research Center, who recently served on the
Ag_cy Special Initiative Team on Technology Transfer;
Judith Watson, a research engineer in the Spacecraft
Structures Branch at Langley Research Center; and
Jonathan Root )9om the Office of Advanced Concepts
and Technology at Headquarters.
A Panel Discussion
Commercializing NASA Technology
by Kevin Barquinero
Space Commerce Opportunities Office
Value-added facilitators for targeted technology trans-
fer is an experiment at NASA to accelerate commer-
cialization of NASA-developed technology. The
hypothesis is that by bringing commercialization
expertise directly to NASA technologists, the proba-
bility of successful technology transfer will be
increased. Two new NASA activities-the Joint Space
Center and Ames Research Center-taken together,
test the value-added facilitator hypothesis.
The phrase "targeted technology transfer" was coined
by Dr. Jerry Creedon of Langley Research Center and
his Special Initiatives Team on Technology Transfer,
chartered by NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin in
May 1992. The team was tasked to review and make
recommendations for improving NASA's process to
transfer and commercialize its aeronautics and space
technology. Their report to the Administrator in
December 1992 identified non-targetedand targeted
technology transfer activities.
Targeted technology transfer involves NASA's con-
scious involvement to collaborate with industry to
commercialize its technology. The team broke down
this category into two subcategories: primary and sec-
ondary targeted technology transfer. Primary targeted
technology transfer occurs when the technology is
part of NASAs primary mission and is developed
from the outset with the purpose in mind of transfer-
ring it to an identified aerospace user." NASA's entire
aeronautics program represents this category. Newer
programs, like the Centers for the Commercial Devel-
opment of Space, are examples from the Agency's
space program.
Secondary targeted technology transfer refers to "tech-
nology originally developed for a NASA mission
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extended by NASA to meet the identified needs of a
specific user for a non-aerospace application." The
committee noted that NASA dedicates very little
effort or resources to this category, although it is this
area, the broader U.S. economy, that otters greater
opportunity for transfer of NASA technology. This is
the only area where the Creedon Committee recom-
mended that NASA increase its budget.
The Creedon Committee report is important because
it affirms the need for NASA to be more active in its
efforts to transfer its technology. The challenge facing
NASA is how to accomplish this mission when its vast
technical talents lie in developing technology for its
aeronautics and space rnissions-not in collaborating
with industry to c-ommercialize this technology. This
is a knowledge gap that thwarts the Agency's best
intentions to transter technology. The premise behind
using facilitators is that they fill the knowledge gap
between NASA's technology and the know-how need-
ed to target the technology's transfer to industry.
It is possible to compress the time for technology
commercialization from a NASA Field Center
through employment of value-added facilitators. The
facilitators unique expertise should accelerate the
process of technology transfer and commercialization,
promote dual-use technology development, and con-
tribute to national and regional economic competi-
tiveness. The metrics for success are: leveraged eco-
nomic development, technolo_,y transfer to existing
companies, technology transter to new firms, and
knowledge transfer. If pilot programs are successful,
NASA will transform itself from its past role as a civil-
ian fixture of the Cold War to a national technological
engine for economic growth through the accomplish-
ments of its aeronautics and space missions.
I1
Creedon Commission Recommendations
by Carol Ginty
Special Initiative Team on Technology Transfer
One member of the Creedon Commission, Carol Ginty,
elaborated on the findings that current and existing
technology transfer processes are non-integrated, undocu-
mented, and too slow. She presented ten recommenda-
tions designed to improve NASAs technology transfer per-
fbrmance:
All NASA elements must implement and be evaluated
on their technology transfer program.
1. Each Center must manage to the recommended
metrics or define and manage to a more effective
set.
.
.
Headquarters must implement a unified plan to
support technology transfer, e.g., provide infra-
structure activites supporting all Centers, and
institute a proactive effort to change the agency's
technology transfer Culture and ensure broader
participation by all erhployees.
NASA should specifically mention technology
transfer in Vision-Mission-Values statements.
.
.
.
The Administrator should send a directive to
Associate Administrators and Center Directors
stating that technology transfer is a mission of
NASA and specifically, that secondary tar{geted
and non-targeted transfers are fully valued,
important NASA missions which should be
managed accordingly.
The Administrator should continue strong tech-
nology transfer support and measure overall
agency performance.
Each Center should include technology transfer
in its mission statement.
7. Each Center should provide technology transfer
training for its employees.
,
.
Assess, promote and reward employees
according to metrics/contributions.
Form and empower at least the following
process action and process development
teams
• Tech Briefs-information acquisition to
publication
• Patent applications and licensing
• Software distribution and transter
• Conversion of non-targeted to secondary
targeted
• Conversion/integration of primary
targeted to secondary targeted
• Execution of secondary targeted
programs
• Use of jointly sponsored research
activities
• Define relationship of Centers to CCDS
• Employee motivation and incentive for
technology transfer activities.
10. Secondary technology transfer activities
should be proactively sought. The budget
allocated to each Center for its use in sec-
ondary targeted transfer programs should
grow and be taken offthe top as is SBIR.
Continuing improvements must be made in
NASAs technology transfer performance for
NASA to best serve the country. NASA:s culture
must change to achieve continuous improvement
in technology transfer. Implementing me ten rec-
ommendations constitutes an important first step
in improving NASA's technology transfer perfor-
mance.
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NASA's Development of the National
Technology Transfer Network
Presented by Jonathan Root
Office of Aeronautices and Space Technology
Jonathan Root outlined selected elements of the Clinton
Administrations technology poli_ described as a flexible,
market-oriented means of advancing U.S. economic
growth and industrial competitiveness.
Abroad, consensus among government and industry
leaders has developed over the last decade on the
importance of applying U.S. leadership in research
and development to enhance and promote U.S. eco-
nomic growth and industrial competitiveness in the
global marketplace. This commitment is further
strengthened by the President's Technology Policy,
which calls for improved strategies for leveraging the
federal research and development investment, involv-
ing over 700 laboratories, through government/indus-
try cooperation in support of industrial technology.
In recognition of this challenge, the NASA Technolo-
gy Transfer Program initiated in 1991 the develop-
ment of the National Technology Transfer Network
(NTTN), in cooperation with other Federal agencies.
Under NASA's leadership, six Regional Technology
Transfer Centers (R'I-T'Cs) and the National Technol-
ogy Transfer Center (NTTC) currently operate as the
core elements of this innovative national network.
The NTT'N serves as a market-driven means of facili-
tating government/industry technology partnerships
and the transfer of Federally funded technology to the
marketplace.
Driven by the pressures of economic competition,
and, more recently, by the defense downsizing, NASA
management recognized that the new environment
offered unprecedented opportunities for collaboration
between industry, state programs, and Federal research
and development agencies and their technology trans-
fer programs and labs. Accordingly, the RTTCs and
the NTTC were concurrently designed and developed
to form the core structure of a national network, link-
ing together federal and state programs and resources
to address the technology and related needs of
industry.
The implementation of the national network began in
January 1992 with the start-up of RTTC operations
in six regions spanning the U.S. The regional deploy-
ment has allowed the RTTCs to establish innovative
linkages and partnerships with a wide range of Federal
labs and state-level programs, along with the regional
organizations of the Federal Laboratory Consortium
for Technology Transfer. The RTTCs draw upon their
regional networks and other elements of the national
network to serve the technology and related business
needs of U.S. firms and industry groups. The RTTCs
assist industry clients to access and commercialize
technologies developed by NASA and other agencies,
and to form technology partnerships with NASA
Centers and other Federal labs. The RTTCs market
orientation and knowledge of industry needs also
National Technology Transfer Network
Far West Region* Mid-Contlnent Mid-West Region
Region
_ National Technology Transfer Center (NTTC)
Regional Technology Transfer Centers (R'ITCs)
"Techology. . . from the lab to the marketplace"
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enables them to assist Federal labs to locate industry
partners and market their technologies for commercial
use. In their first year of operation, the RTTCs pro-
vided services to over 2,500 industry clients. Call
1-800-472-6785 to contact the RTTC in your region.
At the direction of Congress, NASA initiated in 1991
the development of the NTTC to assist and enhance
the technology transfer efforts of all Federal agencies.
Thus, NASA was uniquely positioned to integrate the
NTTC with the RTTCs to form the basis for the
national network. Planning for the center resulted in
the NTTC serving as the national "hub" for the net-
work, providing core capabilities and services in sever-
al key areas. For example, the NTTC operates a
national gateway service that assists U.S. firms to
rapidly locate federal laboratory technology and asso-
ciatedtechnology transfer assistance. The NTTC
gateway service, which began in October 1992,
currently handles between 200 to 300 technical
inquiries from industry per month. Other key NTTC
activities include technology transfer training and
education services; outreach to industry to promote
federal technology transfer; and other initiatives to
stimulate private/public technology partnerships with
Federal labs and further develop the national network.
Call 1-800-678-NTTC to contact the national center.
Overall, the NTTC, the RTTCs and their affiliated
Federal and state programs provide a national frame-
work for the public and private sectors to work
together to leverage the federal Research and Develop-
ment budget for commercial purposes and advance
U.S. economic growth.
Findings of the NASA Technology Integration Review Team
by Judith Watson
Spacecraft Structures Branch, Langley Research Center
The Technology Integration Team was established in
May 1992 as a NASA institutional team commis-
sioned to assess present requirements and approaches
for achieving the integration of state-of-the-art tech-
nology into NASA programs, and to develop recom-
mendations to improve current practices anoprocess-
es for identifying, developing, and integrating
technology into NASA programs. This inter-Center
team is chaired by Dr. J. Wayne Littles, Deputy
Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center.
programs. Consequently, the Team offered the follow-
ing recommendations.
NASA:
° Should develop a nationally accepted vision and
strategy in sufficient depth to provide guidance
for identification and development of required
technologies. The development, use and transfer
of technology should be a mission of the Agency.
The team gathered data from a wide spectrum on per-
tinent sources including NASA Headquarters pro-
gram offices, technologists from three NASA Centers,
NASA project managers, industry, OAST space tech-
nology red and blue teams, the OAST Technology
Integration Study, and the Technology Transfer Insti-
tutional Team. The Technology Integration Team
found that the agency lacks a consistent vision to
which technology research and development can be
directed for successful integration into NASA
• Investment in technology (approximately 30
percent) should be doubled during the next
three years, with two-thirds of the increase
devoted to Advan,_ed Technology Development
and one-third to Research and Technology.
• Should shift its emphasis from controlling initial
development costs to maximizing cost effective-
ness over the life of its programs. Life cycle cost
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Technology Perception
Advancing Technology II
(New, Enabling) //
r Programs -Shelf')
Projects adverse to new
technology due to perceived
increase in risks
• No emphasis on life-cycle costs
should be an integral part of the phased develop-
ment process. In addition, the Agencys technol-
ogy development programs should address life
cycle cost as well as performance factors.
Should implement a phased development
process which includes the early identification of
requirements, early identification of technology
options in collaboration with technologists, and
the maturation and selection of technologies
prior to phase C/D.
• The Agency should establish a [_rocess to enable
its many organizations to work as a system in
identifying, developing, and integrating technol-
ogy into its programs. Agency in'vestments in
base research and focused technology programs
and in advanced technology development must
be based on Agency prioritized needs and poten-
tial benefits.
These findings and recommendations are available in
more detail in the team's final report, Assessment of
Current Processes for Integration of Technology into
NASA's Space Pro,gr,ams. Also, as part of the team's rec-
ommendations, an NMI is has been developed and is
currently under review, which should improve NASA
technology development planning.
Program/Project Perception _ _ ,-_
Major Programs
(Young Vigorous Let's Go!!)
'\\" I I/r///
i Lac.koFcollabo.ionwith \_ _ _ _ I/J/V//
projects g _'_ _ _/'1 ////jV
Not driven by agency strategy
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Commercialization and Dual Use Technologies
The other concurrent Industry, Government and Uni-
versity Partnership pand was devoted to "Commercial-
ization and Dual Use Technologies," led_by William J.
Huffltettler, Manager, New Initiatives Office at Johnson
Space Center. He was joined by Dr. Syed Shariq, Assis-
tant to the Deputy Director, Science and Technology at
Ames Research Center; and Dr. Molly K Macauwy, a
Fellow at Resources for the Future.
Dr. Shariq was also a member of the Creedon Commis-
sion and he presented an overview of their findings on
technology transfer, especially the finding that there is
"no clear NASA policy for technology transz_er. "As a
result of legislation passed in the 1980s, NASA is being
held accountable for its performance under the standards
set in recent and emerging technology transfer statutes.
A Panel Discussion
NASA's EOCAP Program
by Dr. Molly K. Macauley
Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future
NASA's Earth Observations Commercialization
Applications Program (EOCAP) was established upon
recommendation from a 1986 report by NASA's
Space Application Advisory Committee, Linking
Remote-Sensing Technology and Global Needs: A Strate-
gic Vision. The program is intended to encourage U.S.
industry jointly to find NASA remote sensing research
that had commercial potential. A key assumption is
that NASA technology beyond the "proof-of-concept"
stage can readily become commercially profitable.
The first phase of EOCAP, EOCAP I, involved nine
commercial projects each competitively awarded
between $100,000 to $500,000 annually for up to the
three-year duration of the program (1988-1990).
Awards for EOCAP II, involving 11 projects and fed-
eral funds totaling about $6 million, were made in
1991. In both EOCAP I and II, co-funding by indus-
try partners has roughly matched the level of Federal
funding.
EOCAP has been carefully
ments role in a commercial
the activity where the private market, operating on its
own, might fail. Specifically, EOCAP serves to pro-
vide financial and technical support for a limited time
and in areas where markets might fail because of gaps
between science or technology and commercial mar-
kets. Extensive oversight of the program included
periodic reviews using several criteria to measure suc-
cess. These criteria include:
designed to limit govern-
activity to those aspects of
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• Net commercial profitability and/or net public
benefit;
• Development of new product lines with verifi-
able customer willingness to pay;
Reportable innovations that improve the effi-
ciency of relevant markets (for example, stan-
dards for data format, developments in iconogra-
phy); and
Lessons for public policy (when the lessons are
seen as uniquely provided by the EOCAP experi-
ence).
These criteria implicitly admit that even "money
losers" can be successful in some dimensions-prof-
itability may come later, beyond EOCAP, in the case
of the first item above, or some contribution can be
made in terms of innovations that improve the func-
tioning of remote sensing markets. And, of course,
lessons can be learned in ascertaining why projects
failed to be successful in any of these dimensions,
contributing to measurable improvements in future
EOCAP activities.
EOCAP's performance for it first two years included
$5.3 million in gross revenue and $700,000 in net
revenue, for about an 8 percent return on NASA plus
industry investment, a return consistent with com-
mercial market rates of interest during this period.
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pWhat You've Always Known About roject
Management... but Been Afraid to Task
by Bill Sims
Walt Disney Imagineering
ill Sims, a Disney project manager in
charge of "creating the world's best theme
.... g gparks on time and on bud et, and havin
_un doing it, described the construction
of the EuroDisney theme park in France.
The $1.8 billion project on 5,000 acres with seven
hotels opened on time and under budget the previous
April.
As a preface to his main remarks,,Sims spoke on the
vital importance of leadership. Success or failure
comes aown to having the right people, he said.
_Your job is to tell them exactly what to do and give
them the authority and tools to do it." He added that
leaders also need "passion," which is sometimes
known as motivation.
Sims flashed nearly 50 viewgraphs to illustrate his
main points of planning, organizing, coordinating,
directing and controlling the project. A project life
cycle guidebook will lead to mediocrity, he said, rec-
ommending a detailed custom plan instead. "Don't
worship process, _ he said. Instead of following an
elaborate organization chart, Sims recommends col-
laboration plus deliberate tension between functional
groups and operational groups forchecks and balance.
His synonym for coordinating is courtesy, directing
means doing, and a better word for controlling is
"prediction" so as not to look back on a project. "No
risks, no glory," he reminded the conference atten-
dees, suggesting that schedule is also a control docu-
ment.
In an ample question and answer period, Sims offered
attendees a rare glimpse inside a rather private organi-
zation. He said Walt Disney Imagineer_g entered the
computer age only three years earlier. We are pretty
conventional, he said, not leading edge. The orga-
nization also seems to hold on to some rather old
fashioned values such as honesty and fairness. In
building EuroDisney: for example, the organization
refused to buy into the kickback culture but attract-
ed decent European contractors who knew the Ameri-
can group was fair. The organization is also reminis-
cent of an older, collegial, collaborative management
climate in which everyone is on a first-name basis.
Finally, Walt Disney Imagineering writes a new vision
(mission) statement each year. This year it contains
words like "passion" and integrity.
The former Air Force official, who has been with Dis-
ney for four years, says he is "basically a cheerleader."
He will push, challenge, enable and assist his project
team, getting obstacles and blockades out of their way.
Its amazing what you can do if you don't care who
gets the credit, he concluded.
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Provided by the Code FT Program/Project Management Librarian at NASA Headquarters Library
Vision and Strategic Planning
Some of the following authors will tell you that orga-
nizational planning of any kind is most successful
when a vision is in place first. Definitions of vision
var,¢,, but in Charles Handys TheAge of Unreason there
is me following:
A vision has to "reframe" the known scene, to
reconceptualize the obvious, connect the pre-
viously unconnected dream.
Others may prefer the term mission, but rather than
getting bogged down in semantic discussion of vision
and missldn in this short introduction, both may be
seen _ goals that unite an organization and help cre-
ate a plan for the future that can inspire and put all
staff members on the same wavelength. Reading the
listed books and articles will illustrate more clearly the
differences between vision and mission, as well as their
potential impact upon strategic planning.
All of the following are available at Headquarters
Library; for copies of articles with asterisks (*), call the
PPM Librarian at 202-358-0172.
Ackoff, Russell L. Creating the Corporate Future: Plan
orBe Planned For. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1981. PM HD30.28 .A25 1981
Barkdoll, Gerald L. "Scoping Versus Coping:
Developing a Comprehensive Agency Vision." Public
Administration Review 52 #4 0uly/August 1992):330-
338.
* " " • iBeck, Robert N. Visions, Values, and Strateg es:
• " _ 0Changing Attitudes and Culture. Academy f
Management Executive 1 # 1 (February 1987):33-41.
Belasco, James A. Teaching the Elephant to Dance. New
York: Crown Publishers, 1990. HD58.8 .B455 1990
[Chapter 6: Vision Makes the Difference]
*Belasco, James A. "This Vision Thing." Executive
Excellence 7 #1 (January 1990):3-4.
Below, Patrick J. The Executive Guide to Strategic
Planning. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987.
HD30.28 .B45
Bryson, John, ed. Strategic Planningfbr Public Service
and Nonprofit Organizations. Tarrytown, NY_
Pergamon Press, 1993. PM HD30.28 .$73434 1993
Cart, David K. and Ian D. Littman. Excellence in
Government: Total Quality Management in the 1990s.
[Chapter 8] Arlington, VA: Coopers & Lybrand,
1990. PM & QM JK421 .C37 1990
Collins, James C. and Jerry I. Porras. _Organizational
Vision and Visionary Organizations." California
Management Review 34 #1 (Fall 1991):30-52.
_g • • ,c • •Halachml, Arle. Strategic Planning and
Management? Not Necessarily." Public Productivity
Review No. 40 (Winter 1986):35-50.
Handbook of Strategic Planning. New York: J. Wiley,
1986. HD30.38.H3665 1986
Handy, Charles. The Age of Unreason. Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1989. PM HD58.8
.H362 1989 [See especially p.134-136 _The
Language of Leadership."]
Issues in Strategic Planning for Space: Commercial Space
Growth. Wash., D.C.: AIAA, 1989• main circ•
HD9711.75 .I88 1989
Judson, Arnold. Making Strategy Hapj3en:
Transforming Plans into Reality. Cambridge, MA: B.
Blackwell, 1990. [on order]
Kaufman, Roger. Strategic Planning Plus. Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1992. [on order]
Mainelli, Michael. "Vision into Action: A Study of
Corporate Culture." Journal of Strategic Change 1
(1992):189-201.
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Melcher, Bonita H. Strategic Planning: Development
and Implementation. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB
Books, 1988. PM HD30.28 .M437 1988
Mercer, James L. Strategic Planning for Public
Managers. New York: Quorum Books, 1991. main
circ. JS331 .M47 1991
*Nanus, Burt. _Visionary Leadership: How to Re-
Vision the Future." Futurist 26 #5
(September/October 1992):20-25.
NASA. Vision Team Final Report. Washington, D.C.:
NASA, 1993. [in process]
Quigley, Joseph V. Vision: How Leaders Develop It,
Share It, and Sustain It. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1992. [on order]
Senge, Peter. The Fifih Discipline.
Stace, Doug A. and Dexter C. Dunphy. "Translating
Business Strategies into Action: Managing Strategic
Change." Journal of Strategic Change 1 #4(July-
August 1992):203-216.
Strategic Planning for Action and Results. New York:
Conference Board, 1991. PM HD30.28 .$87 1991
Strategic Planning for Public Service and Nonprofit
Organizations. New York: Pergamon Press, 1993.
HD30.28 .$73434 1993
Tenaglia, Mason and Patrick Noonan. "Scenario-
Based Strategic Planning: A Process for Building Top
Management Consensus." Planning Review 20 #4
(March/April 1992): 12-19.
Doing More With Less
It can also be called downsizing or rightsizing, cost
containment or cost reduction; doing more with less
has different meanings and involves different process-
es. The most relevant meaning to NASA may be
doing more (or at least the same) with less funding.
Reducing costs, in general, involves at least two kinds
of costs: the cost of bureaucracy and the cost of not
being entrepreneurial enough. NASA costs also
include operational and development costs.
All of the following are available at Headquarters
Library; for copies of articles with asterisks (*), call the
PPM Librarian at 202-358-0172.
4c cc • • .Corporations are Dissatisfied with Cost-Cutting.
Personnel 68 # 14 (October 1991): 14.
*Geissler, David. _An Approach to Lowering Cost of
Satellite Development. IEEEMilitary
Communications Conference, 30 Sept.-3 Oct. 1990.
(1990):701-703.
Hendricks, Charles F. The Rightsizinq Remedy: How
Managers Can Respond to the Downsizing Dilemma
Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin, 1992.
PM HD69.85 .H46 1992
*Jacobs, Dorri. "Downsizing Without Distress."
Management Worm 18 #2 (March/April 1989):27-28.
Jurie, Jay D. "Structured Query Language: An
Instructional Tool for Public Administration. Public
Productivity and Management Review 15 #3 (Spring
1992):371-380.
*Kirkpatrick, David. Kit's Simply Not Working
[Government]." Fortune 122 #13 (November 19,
1990): 179-196.
*Korn, Susan and Steven Teske. _Creative Approaches
to Corporate Change." Executive Excellence 8 #10
(October 1991):16.
*Kuwahara, Yutaka and Yasutsugu Takeda. _A
Man erial A roach to Research and Develo ment
ag . PP . . P
Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation. IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management 37 #2 (May 1990): 134-138.
Low-Cost Access to Space." Conference and Exhibition.
Shephard Conferences, 1989. oversize TL789 .L3 L68
1989
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*Messmer,Max."Cross-DisciplineTraining."A
StrategicMethodto Do MoreWith Less."
Management Review 81 #5 (May 1992): 26-28.
*Messmer, Max. "Rightsizing, Not Downsizing."
Industry Week 241 #15 (August 3, 1992 ):23, 26.
Michaels, Jack V. and William P. Wood. Design to
Cost. NY_ Wiley, 1989. PM TS167 .M53 1989
*Muller, E.J. "Doing More With Less." Distribution
88 #2 (February 1989): 29-30, 34.
*Neilson, Gary L. "Restructure for Excellence: The
Secret in Downsizing." Management Review 79 #2
(February 1990): 44-47.
*Nienstedt, Philip tL "Effectively Downsizing
Management Structures." Human Resource Planning
12 #2 (1989):155-165.
Osborne, David. Reinventing Government. Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992. JK469.072 1992
Payne, Seth. "Why NASA Will Have to Come Down
to Earth." Business Week#3271 0une 22, 1992):110-
111.
*Pennell, James P. and Robert I. Winner. "Concurrent
Engineering: Practices and Prospects." IEEE Global
Telecommunications Conference and Exhibition
(1989):18.5.1-18.5.9.
Pittinger, Bruce R. "Upside to Downsizing." Executive
Excellence8 #10 (October 1991):15-16.
*Prevost, Tom. "Management's Holy Grail--
Organizational Restructuring." CMA Magazine 66 #1
(February 1992):23-25.
*Reynolds, Larry. "Fed to States: Do More with Less."
Management Review 81 #8 (August 1992):20-21.
*Robinson, Betty and Marvin Druker. "Innovative
Approaches to Downsizing: The Experience in
Maine." Employment Relations 18 #1
(Spring 1991):79-87.
Thompson, Fred. "Management Control and the
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